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The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), an international expert organisation legally based in Switzerland as a non-profit 
foundation, works for the elimination of mines, explosive remnants of war and other explosive hazards, such as unsafe munitions stockpiles. The GICHD 
provides advice and capacity development support, undertakes applied research, disseminates knowledge and best practices and develops standards. 
In cooperation with its partners, the GICHD's work enables national and local authorities in affected countries to effectively and efficiently plan, 
coordinate, implement, monitor and evaluate safe mine action programmes, as well as to implement the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, the 
Convention on Cluster Munitions and other relevant instruments of international law. The GICHD follows the humanitarian principles of humanity, 









© Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
 The designation employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part 































REPORT LAYOUT 1 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS 1 
BACKGROUND TO SUDAN’S LANDMINE/ERW CONTAMINATION 2 
LANDMINE IMPACT SURVEY IN SUDAN 3 
LANDMINE AND ERW CONTAMINATION IN SUDAN 4 
LANDMINE/ERW CASUALTIES IN NORTHERN SUDAN 4 
LANDMINE/ERW CASUALTIES IN SOUTHERN SUDAN 5 
OVERVIEW OF THE NATIONAL MINE ACTION PROGRAMME 6 
PRE-CPA ERA 6 
THE CPA 8 
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NATIONAL MINE ACTION AUTHORITY 9 
THE SUDAN NATIONAL MINE ACTION AND STRATEGIC AND POLICY FRAMEWORK 10 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATIONS 11 
THE NATIONAL MINE ACTION BILL 11 
UN FRAMEWORKS AND PLANS 12 
THE UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FRAMEWORK FOR SUDAN (UNDAF) 13 
SUDAN MINE ACTION SECTOR MULTI YEAR PLANS 13 
THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN SUDAN 15 
MAINSTREAMING GENDER CONSIDERATIONS IN UNMIS 16 
HISTORY OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT 18 
TRANSITION TO NATIONAL OWNERSHIP 22 
THE TRANSITION PLANNING PROCESS 22 
TRANSITION PLANNING WORKSHOPS AND PLANS 22 
THE TRANSITION AND CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT PROCESS: NORTHERN SUDAN 25 
CORE FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITIES OF THE NMAC 26 
Mine Risk Education Department 26 
Victim Assistance Department 27 
Support Department 28 
Information Management Department 29 
Operations Department 30 
The Way Ahead 33 
INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS INVOLVED IN THE CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT PROCESS IN NORTHERN SUDAN 33 
The Danish Church Aid 33 
Association for Aid and Relief, Japan 34 
Mines Advisory Group 35 
TRANSITION AND CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT PROCESS: SOUTHERN SUDAN 36 
THE SSDA 36 
 
TRANSITION TEAM 36 
THE T5 WORKSHOP 36 
THE T5 TRANSITION PLAN 37 
THE SIXTH TRANSITION WORKSHOP 38 
CORE FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITES OF SSDA 40 
MRE and VA Department 40 
Support Services Department 40 
Information Management Department 41 
Operations Department 43 
Residual Capacity 44 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS INVOLVED IN THE CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT PROCESS IN SOUTHERN SUDAN 45 
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) 45 
Mines Advisory Group 46 
Danish Demining Group 47 
Swiss Foundation for Mine Action 48 
The GICHD 48 
POST-INDEPENDENCE: WAY AHEAD 48 
FINDINGS, LESSONS LEARNT AND RECOMMENDATIONS: THE SUDAN MAP 50 
OVERALL FINDINGS 50 
COMPETITION AMONG UN AGENCIES 51 
HIGH UN SALARIES: CHALLENGES IN ABSORBING AND RETAINING COMPETENT STAFF 53 
STAFF RETENTION 54 
DEDICATION, COMMITMENT AND INTENTION TO LEARN IS KEY FOR SUCCESSFUL TRANSITION 54 
TRANSPARENCY AND INFORMATION SHARING 54 
SPECIFIC FINDINGS AND LESSONS LEARNT: NMAC 54 















The author greatly appreciates the many individuals who were willing to share their vast 
experience and knowledge of the transition and capacity development process of the 
Sudan mine action programme. Interviews were conducted with key informants in Juba 
and Khartoum in May and June 2011. Meetings were also organised with other key 
informants in the months after the field trips, either face-to-face or via Skype.1  
 
The author would like to give a special thanks to Stephen Pritchard and Adina Dinca, 
both of UNMAS, for their much appreciated assistance in preparing the missions to Juba 
and Khartoum respectively, and for helping out with arranging meetings.  
 
Lastly, the author is grateful to all the respondents who took the time to review the 













                                                    




GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS 
AAR Association for Aid and Relief Japan 
APMBC Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention  
AT Anti tank 
AP Anti-personnel 
CL Community Liaison 
CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
CTA Chief  Technical Advisor 
DA Dangerous Area 
DDG Danish Demining Group 
BAC Battle Area Clearance 
EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal 
FPDO Friends of Peace and Development Organisation 
ERW Explosive Remnants of War 
GICHD Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
GoNU Government of National Unity 
GoS Government of Sudan 
GoSS Government of Southern Sudan 
HMA Humanitarian Mine Action  
HR Human Resources 
IDP Internally Displaced Persons 
IMAS International Mine Action Standards 
IMSMA Information Management System for Mine Action 
JASMAR Sudanese Association for Combating Landmines 
MAC Mine Action Centre 
MAG Mines Advisory Group 
MAP Mine Action Programme 
MF Minefield 
MRE Mine Risk Education 
MTI Mine Tech International 




NGO Non Government Organisation 
NMAA National Mine Action Authority 
NMAC National Mine Action Centre 
NPA Norwegian People’s Aid 
NRMAO Northern region Mine Action Office 
NTSG National Technical Standards and Guidelines 
OLAVS Operation Landmine Action and Victim Assistance 
OSIL Operation Save Innocent Lives 
SAF Sudanese Armed Forces 
SSDC South Sudan Demining Commission  
SHA Suspected Hazardous Area 
SPLA/M Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement 
TPO Transition Planning Officer 
T5 Transition Plan 5 
UN United Nations 
UNDAF United Nations Development Assistance Framework 
UNDP United Nations Development Programme 
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund 
UNMACC United Nations Mine Action Coordination Centre 
UNMAO United Nations Mine Action Office 
UNMAS United Nations Mine Action Service 
UNMIS United Nations Mission in Sudan 
UNV United Nations Volunteer 








This report gives an overview of the capacity development/transition process of the 
Sudan mine action programme (MAP), from its establishment in 2003 till 2011.  
 
Sudan’s landmine/ERW contamination stems from World War II, the first civil war 
(1955-1972) and the second civil war (1983 – 2004). The Government of Sudan’s (GoS) 
Sudan Armed Forces, the SPLA/M and other non-state actors used landmines/ERW 
throughout these conflicts, the last of which ended with the signing of the Agreement 
on a Permanent Ceasefire in December 2004 and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
(CPA) in 2005.  
 
The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1590 was adopted in March 2005, 
providing the legal foundation to monitor the implementation of the CPA and to 
establish the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). The United Nations Mine Action 
Office (UNMAO) was established to support the UNMIS and to coordinate all mine 
action activities.  The mission plan explicitly stated capacity development as a key focus 
area of the UN mine action programmes. Sudan’s National Mine Action Authority was 
established through Presidential Decree No. 299 in December 2005.2  
 
The 2006 Sudan Mine Action Policy Framework determines the role of UNMAS to be 
that of coordinating mine action activities in collaboration with the national authorities. 
UNMAS had the dual role of coordinating the UNMAO and supporting the UNMIS. In 
addition to these responsibilities, UNMAS was also in charge of administering and 
supervising contracting procedures for tasks, and for coordinating the demining assets 
of the troop-contributing countries.3 UNDP, which was the lead agency for capacity 
development in the UNMAO structure, started its capacity development activities in 
early 2004 and ended in August 2011. In its role as lead agency for MRE within the 
UNMAO framework, UNICEF coordinated and provided technical support, developed 
training and promoted best practices. 
 
The formal transition planning process started with a transition workshop in Nairobi in 
2008, bringing UNMAO agencies and representatives from SSDA and NMAC together.  
Another five transition workshops were organised by June 2011.  
 
Over that time, the slow progress of capacity development/transition efforts in 
southern Sudan has been in sharp contrast to that of northern Sudan. One key reason 
for this discrepancy may be traced to the fact that the general level of capacity is 
considerably higher in the north compared to the south, explained in part by higher 
levels of education, more advanced infrastructure, and most importantly, considerably 
lower impacts of the war on all levels of society. As of mid-2011, UNMAO had taken the 
                                                    
2
 Presidential Decree No. 299 (2005), http://www.sudan-
map.org/DocDownload/Program/FormationoftheNationalMineActionAuthorityNMAA.pdf  
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lead in all major elements of operations, including accreditation, tasking, quality 
assurance and quality control. The weakest area in SSDA’s operations department 
remains in tasking operators through the issuing of clear, concise and accurate task 
dossiers.  
 
NMAC’s operations department on the other hand became increasingly involved in 
prioritisation processes, and took full responsibility of tasking procedures from 1 April 
2011, with technical assistance from UNMAO.  
 
As per the CPA, an internationally monitored referendum took place on 9 January 2011, 
with 98.83 per cent voting for secession. The independence of South Sudan, declared on 
9 July 2011, effectively terminated the interim arrangements, agreed to by the NCP and 
the SPLA/M through the signing of the CPA. Following the end of the UNMIS mandate in 
July 2011, the UNMAO concluded its activities in Sudan. At the request of the GoS, 
UNMAS continued providing assistance to mine action in Sudan through technical 
support to NMAC. Following the independence of South Sudan, the UNSCR 1996 of 8 
July 2011 defines the mandate of the UN as supporting the republic of South Sudan in 
mine action activities, and in building the capacities of the SSDA. This new mandate 
resulted in the mine action office changing its name from UNMAO to the UN Mine 
Action Coordination Centre in September 2011.  
 
The report’s main findings regarding the transition to national ownership in Sudan are 
summarised as follows:  
Overall findings 
• The MAP has been praised for its impressive clearance outputs, but criticised for 
its weak implementation of capacity development activities. We recommend 
that capacity development roles and responsibilities should be clearly defined in 
relevant ToR and job descriptions and staff should be required to report on 
these activities. This would help clarify who is responsible for what and it would 
avoid the risk of capacity development being marginalised and viewed as an area 
that is not included in “getting the job done”. 
• The MAP suffered from a lack of communication and cooperation between 
different UN agencies within UNMAO. We recommend the UN inter-agency 
policy be reviewed, and that, for any collaborations among UN agencies, the 
agencies involved agree upon a memorandum of understanding which clearly 
defines the roles and responsibilities of the different agencies in that specific 
context. We also recommend that capacity development roles and 
responsibilities are included in the ToR for all relevant personnel, which will 
require agreement on these ToR by senior staff. The different roles and 
responsibilities should be complementary and clear to all stakeholders involved.  
• There were many examples of individuals benefiting from capacity development 




missed opportunities for the national mine action authorities to reap the 
benefits from capacity development activities. 
• Dedication, commitment and intention to learn is key for successful capacity 
development and transition. The extent and rate of progress is in the hands 
of the impacted states – external agencies can only assist and support. 
• Transparency and information sharing are key aspects of capacity development. 
Examples of good information sharing and transparency illustrate strengthened 
trust, whereas a lack of these points to the opposite.  
  
Specific findings and lessons learnt: NMAC 
• Transition should have been made a priority at an earlier stage.  
• The transition plan clarified the transition process, and the transition matrix was 
an excellent tool for focussing on the activities that had to be carried out, which 
element of the transition plan each corresponded to, the status of the activity, 
the individuals responsible, and the deadline for completion.  
• Transition processes should aim to adapt to national procedures, rather than 
transferring the “UN way” of doing things.  
• The capacity level of NMAC’s various departments strengthened considerably 
when UNMAO staff collocated at the NMAC premises in early 2010. 
 
Specific findings and lessons learnt: SSDA 
• Recruitment procedures need to be made more transparent and rigorous to 
ensure that individuals are recruited based on their competencies, experience 
and skills, and not on the basis of tribal or political affiliation. 
• There is no clear separation between the Authority and the MAC at the SSDA. 
SSDA is responsible both for broad policy decisions and for overseeing mine 
action on a day-to-day basis at the operational level. To clarify SSDA’s mandate, 
we recommend that the operational and authority levels be separated.  
• To avoid key stakeholders “disassociating” themselves from transition plans, and 
to make the most of the momentum from workshops, we recommend that 
future transition plans are drafted and distributed as soon after the workshops 
as possible. 
• On-the-job training needs to be included in work plans and stipulated in relevant 
UNMACC staff’s ToRs. 
• The collaboration between NPA and UNMAO has been excellent, with UNMAO 
playing an instrumental role in securing donor funding for NPA’s capacity 
development project. This particular collaboration represents a best-practice, 
and we recommend that it be continued, and where appropriate, replicated in 
other countries. 
• Organisational structures, systems, processes and resources required for the 
implementation of SSDA’s mandate, function and the delivery of services need 




• We recommend that the development of SSDA’s capacity is integrated with the 
national capacity development process and aligned with national development 








This report gives an overview of the capacity development/transition process of the 
Sudan mine action programme (MAP), from its establishment in 2003 till 2011. It starts 
by outlining a brief overview of key development indicators for northern and southern 
Sudan4, before moving on to present the background to landmine/explosive remnants 
of war (ERW) contamination, and how it was initially assessed.  
 
A brief overview of the landmine and ERW contamination and casualty situation since 
June 2011 is followed by an outline of the historical background on the Sudan MAP, 
presenting key events and developments, and the normative framework. The report 
then outlines the main United Nations (UN) agencies involved in the process, and their 
key responsibilities.  
 
The “transition to national ownership” chapter presents the transition planning process, 
outlining key events, presenting the transition workshops and plan. The report then 
focuses on the capacity development and transition process of northern Sudan. The 
various departments of the national mine action centre (NMAC) are presented, 
highlighting the main capacity development activities and key challenges.  
 
The same is done with southern Sudan, before presenting findings and lessons learnt to 
conclude the report. General findings related to the overall Sudan MAP are first 
presented, followed by findings and lessons learnt related specifically to northern 
Sudan, and then southern Sudan. Recommendations are provided in conjunction with 
some of the findings when deemed relevant, and a time-line for the Sudan MAP is 
provided in Annex 2.  
 
This report does not cover the Darfur programme, as there are no National Mine Action 
Authority (NMAA) structures in that region.  
SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS
5 
According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), in 2010, 46.5 per 
cent of northern Sudan’s population was living below the poverty line, and the figure in 
southern Sudan was 50.6 per cent. To compare, South Sudan is not faring much worse 
                                                    
4 This case study reviews the Mine Action Programme of Sudan, when Sudan was a unified country, comprising the 
northern region and the semi-autonomous region of southern Sudan. As a result of the January 2011 referendum, 
South Sudan declared its independence on 9 July 2011. This case study mainly focuses on activities pre-independence 
and therefore uses the term “southern Sudan“ when describing the southern region of Sudan.  The term “South 
Sudan” is used when describing any events post-9 July 2011. 






than its northern neighbour, if their respective populations and GDP are taken into 
account; Sudan has 30.1 million people and a GDP of 49 billion US dollars while South 
Sudan has 8.26 million people and a GDP of 13 billion US dollars.  
 
Other key development indicators on health and education provide a more sobering 
picture however. In 2010, 48 per cent of the children in southern Sudan were 
malnourished, while in northern Sudan the figure was 31.8 per cent. Similarly, infant 
mortality rates were much higher in southern Sudan than in northern Sudan, with the 
former experiencing 131 deaths per 1,000 live births and the latter 71 deaths per 1,000 
live births. In terms of education, the gross primary enrolment ration in southern Sudan 
was only 48 per cent, compared to 71.1 per cent in northern Sudan. The adult literacy 
rate stood at 37 per cent in southern Sudan and 78 per cent in northern Sudan. On one 
hand, these indicators provide a clear picture of the development challenges faced by 
northern and southern Sudan, and on the other, of the differences between the two 
regions.  
 
As will be demonstrated in this report, these differences are reflected in the 
discrepancies between capacity levels between Sudan and South Sudan.  
 
BACKGROUND TO SUDAN’S LANDMINE/ERW CONTAMINATION 
Since Sudan’s independence in 1965, the country has only seen peace for a total of 11 
years. Autonomy for the southern Sudan region was agreed through the 1972 Addis 
Ababa agreement, putting an end to the first civil war (1955-1972). The agreement 
aimed to address concerns of the southern Sudan liberation movement. Despite relative 
calm over the next decade, tensions between southern Sudan and the central 
government in Khartoum remained. In 1983, lead by Dr. John Garang, the Sudan 
People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) rebelled against the central government in Khartoum, 
initiating the second civil war (1983 – 2004). The signing of the Agreement on a 
Permanent Ceasefire in December 2004 paved the way for the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) in 2005, putting an end to Africa’s longest war.6  
 
The Government of Sudan’s (GoS) military, the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), the SPLA/M 
and other non-state actors used landmines/ERW throughout the civil wars. Landmine 
contamination can also be traced to World War II, when landmines were laid along the 
northern border with Libya. The second civil war was essentially a guerrilla conflict, with 
the GoS holding a few garrison towns, including Juba, Malakal and Wau, and 
surrounding outposts, while SPLA controlled much of the countryside in the south. The 
guerrilla warfare continued throughout the second civil war, with SAF and SPLA 
controlling various towns and areas of land, resulting in roads and communities along 
the frontlines becoming severely contaminated with landmines/ERW.  
                                                    






Anti-personnel (AP) and anti-tank (AT) landmines were used by both sides in a wide 
range of areas, including key roads, towns, rural communities, around water sources 
and across arable land. AT mines were mainly used on roads by SPLA/M to restrict the 
movements of GoS forces and to limit access to the towns. GoS used AP mines 
defensively to protect its garrison towns and to prohibit movement of SPLA/M forces. 
Upon the signing of the CPA, Sudan emerged as a country contaminated by landmines 
and ERW, making an impact on transport, socio-economic development rehabilitation 
and reconstruction, and hindering the return of internally displaced persons (IDP) and 
refugees to their home communities.  
 
LANDMINE IMPACT SURVEY IN SUDAN 
At the request of the UN Mine Action Services (UNMAS) and the GoS, the Survey Action 
Centre (SAC) initiated its activities in Sudan, with an advanced survey mission to South 
Kordofan in 2003, in order to provide an initial understanding of the extent of landmine 
contamination. At this point, landmines were perceived as a major problem in Sudan. 
Infrastructure was poor or nonexistent, which, combined with the insecurity that 
remained in many areas, resulted in little or no reliable available data as to the actual 
levels of contamination. The Danish Church Aid (DCA) and the Sudan Landmine and 
Information Response Initiative (SLIRI) were the major operators at the time. The Mines 
Advisory Group (MAG), serving as SAC’s partner, implemented the first pilot Landmine 
Impact Survey (LIS) in 2006, in the Eastern Equatoria State.  
 
Through the implementation of surveys in 15 states, the LIS identified a total of 296 
impacted communities in Sudan. Out of these communities, eight per cent were 
categorised as high-impact, 29 per cent as medium-impact, and 63 per cent as low-
impact.7 The LIS established that the landmine problem was predominantly 
concentrated in five of the 25 states located in the southern, central and eastern parts 
of Sudan: Central Equatoria, Southern Kordofan, Eastern Equatoria, Blue Nile and 
Kassala.  Also, all of the 25 communities were categorised as high-impact, and 71 of the 
85 categorised as medium-impact were located in these five states.  
 
Upon completion of the survey of each area, the LIS results were shared on the Sudan 
Mine Action Programme website, permitting further surveys and verification of the 
findings to be carried out. Between the completion of the first LIS in 2006 and 2009, 
UNMAO tasked operators to implement technical surveys in 241 of the 605 suspected 
hazardous areas (SHAs) identified by the LIS. Simultaneously, the implementing partners 
also conducted a so-called “retrofit” - a verification of all dangerous areas recorded in 
the national database since 2002.  
 
                                                    
7 Survey Action Centre, Landmine Impact Survey. Republic of the Sudan, 2009, http://www.sac-




LANDMINE AND ERW CONTAMINATION IN SUDAN 
UNMAO’s monthly report from June 20118 lists the following statistics in relation to 
“closed hazards”9:  
 
• 6,366 dangerous areas 
• 188 minefields 
• 331 SHAs 
 
The following “open hazards” were reported: 
 
• 719 dangerous areas 
• 118 minefields 
• 274 SHAs 
 
A regional breakdown shows that 575 out of the total 719 open dangerous areas were 
in southern Sudan, 42 in the western region (Darfur), and the rest in the northern 
region. As for the open minefields, 57 out of 118 were located in southern Sudan, with 
the rest in the northern region. Out of the total 274 open SHAs, 180 were located in 
southern Sudan, with the rest in the northern region.  
 
It is important to note that more landmines were laid in both southern Sudan and 
northern Sudan in mid-2011. Volatile security situations in a number of states in 
southern Sudan, particularly Jonglei, Upper Nile and Unity, has meant that access has 
been restricted, and, as a result, the actual level of contamination of some areas 
remains unknown.  
 
LANDMINE/ERW CASUALTIES IN NORTHERN SUDAN 
The UN Mine Action Office (UNMAO) recorded a total of 1,651 landmine/ERW 
casualties in northern Sudan (493 killed; 1,158 injured) between 1964 and the end of 
2010. Of all casualties, 1,477 or 89 per cent were male. The Landmine and Cluster 
Munition Monitor
10 reported 67 landmine/ERW casualties in northern Sudan in 2010. Of 
the casualties, 88 per cent were male (59), and half of all casualties for which the age 
was known were children, mostly boys.  
 
12 per cent (eight) of all casualties in 2010 were female casualties: five of these were 
girls. The 67 casualties reported in 2010 was an increase from 40 in 2009. 
Improvements in Sudan’s data collection system and more available data, with a new 
                                                    
8 http://www.sudan-map.org/DocDownload/IMSMA/IMSMAMonthlyReportJune2011.pdf 
9 “Closed hazards” refer to tasks that have been completed, and “open hazards” refer to tasks that have not been 
completed 





national casualty database launched in September 2010, may have contributed to the 
increase in reported casualties. Casualties were recorded in six states for the 2010 data, 
of which three were in the Darfur region. Over half of all casualties recorded in 2010 
(33) were in the state of Kassala.  
 
LANDMINE/ERW CASUALTIES IN SOUTHERN SUDAN 
The Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor
11 notes that a total of 4,283 casualties 
(1,226 killed; 3,057 injured) were recorded by UNMAO in southern Sudan for the period 
ranging from 1964 to December 2010. Of the total number of casualties, 3,076 or 72 per 
cent were male and 583 or 14 per cent were female; the sex was unknown for 624 
casualties.  
 
However, the absence of a comprehensive casualty survey, combined with very poor 
health facilities and inaccessible areas, have resulted in a widespread belief that there is 
serious underreporting, and that the actual casualty number is considerably higher. 
During the same timeframe, UNMAO reported a total of 64 casualties from cluster 
munitions in southern Sudan, all of which occurred prior to 2010.   
The Monitor further points out that 2010 saw 82 new landmine/ERW casualties. 
Children made up the majority of all casualties (43) and 57 per cent of civilian casualties, 
with boys being the single largest casualty group (36).  There were a total of 17 female 
casualties: seven girls, six women, and four of unknown age.  Casualties were identified 
in all three regions of southern Sudan and in seven of its ten states. The greatest 
number of casualties occurred in the state of Northern Bahr el Ghazal, followed by 
Upper Nile state, both of which border northern Sudan. The 82 casualties identified in 
2010 are more than double the 38 casualties recorded in 2009. A number of factors can 
explain this increase, including rise in the movement of people, as large groups of 
returnees came back to southern Sudan to vote in the January 2011 referendum, and an 
increased level of violence, particularly in the border areas with northern Sudan. 
 
  
                                                    





OVERVIEW OF THE NATIONAL MINE ACTION PROGRAMME 
PRE-CPA ERA 
With the support of the European Commission and Landmine Action, the Sudan 
Landmine Information and Response Initiative (SLIRI) was established in 2001 as a cross-
line project to initiate information gathering and develop a mine action plan. The 
signing of the Nuba Mountains Ceasefire Agreement12 in 2002 resulted in the GoS and 
the SPLA/M cooperating in mine action as early as 2002. This collaboration was notable 
in that it created a space for dialogue between the conflicting parties, while preparing 
the grounds for peace-building, even in the middle of ongoing conflict. The Ceasefire 
Agreement established an international Joint Military Commission (JMC) to monitor the 
ceasefire, and opened the door for mine action activities to begin in Southern Kordofan. 
 
At the request for assistance in mine action by the GoS and the UN in Sudan, the 
UNMAS established an emergency mine action programme, the “Information 
Management and Coordination for Emergency Mine Action in Sudan” in early 2002.13 
The objective of this programme was to: 
 
• work within the confines of the pre-peace/ongoing conflict environment  
• develop standards, establish and document operational capacity and 
professionalism of national NGOs 
• promote and assist the development of a national mine action planning and 
coordination body that would be able to plan and cope with increased mine 
action activities following any peace settlement14  
 
With no solid peace agreement in place however, most donors were reluctant to 
allocate funds for mine action operations in Sudan, which resulted in few national and 
international organisations implementing mine action operations. Most of the early 
activities were limited to the Nuba Mountain region (current Kordofan State), where 
international actors monitored a cease fire agreement, as well as in Rumbek, the 
previous capital of southern Sudan (located in the current state of Lakes).  
 
The early engagement of UNMAS in emergency mine action assistance in Sudan was 
influenced by the UN mine action policy (A/53/496/Annex II) and was in accordance 
with a General Assembly Resolution on Emergency Assistance to the Sudan 
(A/RES/56/112, OP.14). The details of the UN emergency mine action project were 
agreed upon in a memorandum of understanding between the GoS, SPLM and the UN in 
                                                    
12 Nuba Mountains Ceasefire Agreement, 2002, 
http://www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_union/pdfs/igad/NubaCeasefire.pdf  
13 United Nations emergency mine action project in Sudan, www. http://www.mineaction.org/docs/608_.asp,  





September 2002.15 The memorandum of understanding was significant in a number of 
ways:16 
 
• it was the first “state-wide” document that the main conflicting parties (GoS and 
SPLA/M) signed 
• it prepared the ground for pre-CPA peace negotiations  
• it was instrumental for the inclusion of important mine action aspects in the 
subsequent CPA17 
 
As an operation partner of the JMC, the Danish Church Aid (DCA) implemented the first 
cross-border demining activities in the Nuba Mountains in 2002. These first clearance 
activities were unique, in the sense that the clearance team was composed of equal 
numbers of deminers from each side of the two main conflicting parties, northern and 
southern Sudan. The national organisations, JASMAR from northern Sudan, and 
Operation Save Innocent Lives (OSIL) from southern Sudan, initiated an operational 
partnership, with direct supervision by the DCA.  
 
Upon completion of the training and IMAS accreditation, the team’s first task was to 
clear the main road leading to the project’s training camp. After the success of this 
initial pilot project, the demining programme grew in size, and more civilians from both 
sides enrolled in the basic demining course. These first clearance activities, composed of 
deminers from both sides, built confidence between the two main conflicting parties, 
and represented a concrete and tangible outcome of the Nuba Mountains Ceasefire 
Agreement.  
 
Subsequently, the national mine action office - based in Khartoum, and the new Sudan 
mine action directorate based in Nairobi, were established in 2003, with the objective of 
carrying out emergency clearance operations of landmines and ERW.  
 
In 2004, the GoS, SPLM and the UN signed the first versions of the Sudan National Mine 
Action Strategic Framework and the Sudan National Mine Action Policy Framework.  
These documents stated that mine action in Sudan would have a “one country 
approach”. In the run up to the signing of the CPA, the Swiss Foundation for Mine 
Action (FSD) began operations in collaboration with the World Food Programme (WFP) 
and the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) in southern Sudan in February 
2004, conducting route surveys on priority routes for reconstruction. The commercial 
company Mechem, under contract with United Nations Office for Project Services 
(UNOPS), also began survey and clearance of routes in March 2004.  The Norwegian 
                                                    
15 Memorandum of understanding between the Government of Sudan, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and 
the United Nations regarding the UN’s mine action support to Sudan, 
http://www.mineaction.org/downloads/MOU.pdf  
16 Interview with Chris Clark, (former UNMAS Programme Manager in Sudan 2001 – 2002) in Geneva 30 may 2011 
17 This is in line with the UN Inter-Agency Coordination Group on Mine Action’s Mine Action Guidelines for Ceasefire 




People’s Aid (NPA), an organisation that had been active in southern Sudan since 1986, 
expanded its humanitarian programme to include mine action in 2004.  
 
As a response to the June 2004 signature of the declaration in Nairobi, in which six 
protocols were signed between the GoS and the SPLM/A, and following the adoption of 
UN Security Council Resolution 154718 in June 2004, the United Nations Advanced 
Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS) was established.  The UNAMIS was essentially a political 
mission, dedicated to facilitating contact between the conflicting parties, and to 
preparing for the expected peace support operation, following the signing of the CPA, 
but did not explicitly mandate any mine action activities.    
 
THE CPA 
The second civil war between SAF and the SPLA ended with the signing of the CPA19 
between the GoS and the SPLA/M in Nairobi, Kenya on 9 January 2005. The signing was 
the result of more than two and a half years of negotiations between the SPLA/M and 
the ruling National Congress Party (NRC). The CPA provided for an initial pre-interim 
period of six months, followed by an interim period of six years. The interim 
arrangement set out that the single state of Sudan should be ruled by the Government 
of National Unity, and the semi-autonomous government of southern Sudan (GOSS). 
This interim arrangement is often referred to as the “one state two system approach”.  
 
In annex 1 on “Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation 
Modalities and Appendices”, the CPA includes a specific paragraph on safeguarding 
“…against the menace and hazards posed by landmines and unexploded ordnance”. This 
paragraph is divided into six subparagraphs, presenting issues related to the prohibition 
and clearance of landmines, as well as the establishment of demining authorities in 
northern and southern Sudan respectively. Paragraph 8.6.5 of the CPA states that “the 
UN Support Mission, in conjunction with UNMAO, will assist the Parties’ demining efforts 
by providing technical advice and coordination...” Paragraph 8.6.6 states that the parties 
shall establish by D-day (signing of the CPA) + 30 days two demining authorities 
(northern and southern) that shall work together and coordinate their demining 
activities and work jointly in close cooperation with UNMAO.  
 
Key milestones during the interim period include the 2009 democratic elections, and the 
January 2011 referendum. The signing of the CPA, and the subsequent influx of donor 
money, mainly through the Department of Peacekeeping Operations’ (DPKO) Assessed 
Budget20, resulted in a significant expansion of mine action operations in Sudan. From its 
                                                    
18 UN Security Council Resolution 1546 (2004), 
http://www.issafrica.org/AF/profiles/Sudan/darfur/unres1547jun04.pdf  
19 http://unmis.unmissions.org/Portals/UNMIS/Documents/General/cpa-en.pdf  
20 The assessed budget of UN DPKO missions are determined by UN Security Council Resolutions and are to cover the 
costs of core peacekeeping functions, but do not cover all the costs within peacekeeping mandates. In Sudan, the UN 




inception in 2003, the Sudan MAP grew to be the world’s second largest mine action 
programme (after Afghanistan), with an annual budget of USD 70 million in 2011.21 22 
 
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NATIONAL MINE ACTION AUTHORITY 
Acting upon Article 58 (1) of the Interim Constitution of 2005, and Chapter VI of the 
CPA, and following Sudan’s decree ratifying the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on their 
Destruction (in short, the Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC)), Sudan’s 
National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) was established through Presidential Decree 
No. 299 in December 2005.23  
  
Officially launched in March 2006, the NMAA comprised a national mine action 
committee, a general secretariat (headed by the Minister of Humanitarian Affairs, the 
Government of National Unity (GONU), a national mine action centre (NMAC), and a 
southern Sudan regional mine action centre (RMAC). The decree set out the structure of 
the authority, and the structures, authorities and responsibilities of the NMAC located 
in Khartoum and the RMAC based in Juba. The national mine action committee was an 
inter-ministerial body, with representatives from civil society, SAF, SPLA and GoSS. The 
committee exercised its responsibilities through the deputy Minister of Humanitarian 
Affairs - the committee’s secretary general. The presidential decree further stipulated 
that financial resources should be allocated by the government, and that the Ministries 
of Humanitarian Affairs, Finance and Defence, along with other designated parties, 
should take necessary measures to implement the decree. With technical and advisory 
support from UNDP, mine action activities were included in the national budgets from 
2006.  
 
The RMAC changed its name to the Southern Sudan Demining Authority (SSDA) through 
GOSS’s Presidential Decree No. 45 in June 2006.24 The president of southern Sudan, 
General Salva Kiir Mayardit, decreed the appointment of a chair person, a deputy 
chairperson and three executive members. The decree mandated the SSDA to formulate 
and implement plans for clearance activities, and it urged it to cooperate and 
collaborate with relevant national and international institutions that had expertise in 
the field, while working closely with the SPLA and the SAF.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                           
assistance. Funding from the voluntary trust fund (VTF) has been used for demining in support of humanitarian 
assistance, including for mine risk education and victim assistance 
(http://www.mineaction.org/section.asp?s=who_pays_for_it)  
21 UNMAO Profile 16 June 2011, http://sudan-map.org/OLD/DocDownload/Program/UNMAOprofileJune2011.pdf  
22 Annex 3 provides a summary of total VTF and assessed budget contributions to the Sudan MAP from 2003 - 2010 
23 Presidential Decree No. 299 (2005), http://www.sudan-
map.org/DocDownload/Program/FormationoftheNationalMineActionAuthorityNMAA.pdf  
24 GoSS Presidential Decree No. 45/2006, 27 June 2006, http://unmis.unmissions.org/Portals/UNMIS/CPAper 





THE SUDAN NATIONAL MINE ACTION AND STRATEGIC AND POLICY 
FRAMEWORK 
Initially developed and endorsed in 2004, the updated National Mine Action Strategic 
Framework 2006 – 2011
25 was prepared by a joint action team from the GoS and the 
UNMIS, and was endorsed by Presidential Decree No 283 in August 2006. The strategic 
framework presented the vision, mission, 11 strategic goals and 12 key mine action 
priorities for Sudan. Importantly, four out of the eleven strategic goals related directly 
to the transition and capacity development process:  
 
1. Goal 4: to strengthen and expand the existing national capacities, to ensure 
physical, psycho-social and economic rehabilitation and reintegration of 
mine/ERW victims and survivors. 
2. Goal 5: to strengthen and expand the existing national mine action institutional 
framework, to be able to plan, implement, coordinate and monitor all aspects of 
mine action. 
3. Goal 6: to develop and implement a transitional plan, to facilitate the transition 
of mine action management from the UN to national authorities. 
4. Goal 7: to strengthen and expand the existing national operations capacities in 
mine action surveys, mine/ERW clearance, MRE and victim assistance.  
 
The Sudan National Mine Action Strategic and Policy Framework26 of June 2006 recalled 
that the CPA stipulated that Sudan should remain united during the transitional period 
until the 2011 referendum for the citizens of southern Sudan. This “one country 
approach” was based on CPA’s “one country, two systems approach”, essentially 
meaning unified national coordination, planning and implementation across the 
country. The establishment of a NMAA was seen as essential for Sudan to be able to 
fulfil its obligations under the APMBC, and to carry out all tasks at a national level, while 
recognising north-south differences, as set out in the CPA.  The mine action policy 
framework presented 11 key principles, of which two were directly relevant to the 
capacity development/transition process: 
 
1. Principle 3: to enhance the Sudanese leadership and ownership, through 
developing their skills, expertise, and abilities to plan, implement and monitor all 
aspects of mine action in the Sudan within the framework of the NMAA  
2. Principle 6: all mine action projects must have a strong local/national mine 
action capacity building element.   
 
The policy framework also set out the roles of key national and international actors, 
                                                    
25 The Sudan National Mine Action Strategic Framework 2006 – 2011, http://www.sudan- 
map.org/DocDownload/Program/SudanMineActionStrategicFramework.pdf  





such as the NMAC, UNMIS, UNMAS, UNDP, UNICEF and national and international civil 
society organisations and the private sector.  
 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATIONS  
Sudan signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and 
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction on 4 December 1997.  
Subsequent to the convention’s ratification in October 2003, the Convention entered 
into force for Sudan on 1 April 2004. Sudan has regularly submitted its annual 
transparency report as required by Article 7, and the latest report for 2010 was 
submitted in April 2011.  
 
In compliance with Article 4, Sudan destroyed all stockpiled anti-personnel landmines 
before the deadline of April 2008. According to Article 5 of the Convention, Sudan 
should clear all known mined areas by the end of March 2014, or else apply for an 
extension. Sudan completed its stockpile destruction obligations in March 2008, 
complying with its treaty deadline of 1 April 2008. Sudan also signed the Convention on 
Conventional Weapons in April 1981, but has not ratified it. Sudan signed The 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) in March 2007, and it was 
ratified in April 2009. Sudan has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions 
(CCM).  
 
The SPLM/A signed Geneva Call’s Deed of Commitment for Adherence to a Total Ban of 
Anti-Personnel Mines and for Cooperation in Mine Action in 2001. Building on this initial 
commitment, South Sudan expressed a keen interest to succeed to the APMBC shortly 
after its independence, and became the 158th state party to the convention on 11 
November 2011. At the time of writing, it was still unclear how the clearance deadlines 
of Article 4 and 5 will be determined.  
 
THE NATIONAL MINE ACTION BILL  
Sudan adopted the Sudan Mine Action Bill27 by Presidential Decree No. 51 in March 
2010. The act comprises 29 articles that are divided into four chapters: 
 
1. Preliminary provisions. 
2. National committee, national centre and regional centre, the formation 
of the national committee. 
3. Financial provisions and financial resources. 
4. General provisions, prohibit the use of anti-personnel mines. 
 
 
                                                    





UN FRAMEWORKS AND PLANS  
The UN document Mine Action and Effective Coordination: the United Nations Inter-
Agency Policy of June 2005, highlights various issues in relation to assistance to mine-
affected states and national ownership in its “common positions” section.28  Paragraph 
16 notes: “To ensure the most effective and appropriate response to the landmine 
threat, United Nations mine action activities promote national ownership, institution-
building and capacity development, and are contingent on adherence to the core 
requirements of the IMAS…” Paragraph 18 highlights that “in certain exceptional 
circumstances, it may be appropriate for the United Nations to assume some or all of the 
responsibilities, normally undertaken by a national mine action authority”.  Paragraph 
63 further notes that in programmes managed by the UN, the UN “Coordinates 
development of a plan, in collaboration with national and UN partners, establishing the 
milestones to be reached before management of the programmes is transferred to 
national authorities”. Paragraph 64 is dedicated entirely to the transition process: 
 
“Where the United Nations has been managing a programme on behalf of a 
national or local authority, the United Nations encourages or assists the 
government to develop a plan to transfer responsibility for the programme to the 
national authorities, based on the attainment of agreed milestones as part of a 
single and integrated strategy. The transfer process will normally be 
implemented as a phased activity, as capacity is developed within the national 
and local structures. The process will culminate when appropriate capabilities 
exist within these structures, and the formal handover of remaining 




The United Nations Inter-Agency Mine Action Strategy for 2006 - 2010 outlines the 
strategic objectives and indicators for UN mine action, and is informed by Mine Action 
and Effective Coordination: the United Nations Inter-Agency Policy. It promotes 
achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, and full adherence to and 
compliance with relevant treaties and other international instruments, in particular the 
APMBC, the convention on conventional weapons and relevant human rights 
instruments. The strategy stated the following in its situation analysis: “National 
ownership of mine action programmes has proven critical to long-term success”. 
30 The 
strategy’s objective number four was to: “Assist the development of national institutions 
to manage the landmine/ERW threat, and at the same time prepare for residual 
response capacity in at least 15 countries”. 
31 The strategy presented two activities and 
two indicators of achievement for this specific objective. 32 
                                                    
28 Mine Action and Effective Coordination: the United Nations Inter-Agency Policy”,  June 2005, p. 3 
29 Mine Action and Effective Coordination: the United Nations Inter-Agency Policy, June 2005,  
30 The United Nations Inter-Agency Mine Action Strategy: 2006-2010, p. 5 
31 Ibid. p. 12 
32 Ibid. The major activities are to: 
a) Provide capacity development support to enable national mine action institutions to manage, 





THE UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FRAMEWORK FOR 
SUDAN (UNDAF) 
The UNDAF 2009 – 2012 set out to provide a framework for how the UN could respond 
to Sudan’s national priorities and needs in an effective, systematic and coherent way. 
The overarching goal of the UNDAF was consolidating peace and stability, with four 
interrelated areas of cooperation: 
 
1. Peace building. 
2. Governance and rule of law. 
3. Livelihoods and productive sectors. 
4. Basic services. 
  
Mine action fell under the peace-building area, and UNDAF anticipated the following 
output: “Strengthened national institutions’ capacity to prioritize, coordinate and 
manage all aspects of mine action at central and state levels, including implementation 
of national and international obligations under the Ottawa Conventions (UNMAO, 
UNDP)”. 
33
 The UNDAF further established the target of the NMAA and the Southern 
Sudan Demining Commission, taking full responsibility of mine action by 2011, with 
domestic mine action laws in place.  
SUDAN MINE ACTION SECTOR MULTI YEAR PLANS 
Sudan’s mine action sector, comprising national authorities, the UN and NGOs, agreed 
in 2008 that they would together develop a multi-year plan, covering all the 
components of mine action, through sector-wide consultations.  
 
The 2006-2011 Multi year Plan34 that was endorsed by the SSDA, the NMAC and 
UNMAO, was the first plan of such kind to be developed for the mine action sector in 
Sudan. The purpose of the plan was to demonstrate the commitments of all the 
Sudanese mine action sector partners to implement mine action activities in accordance 
with the national strategic framework, and towards meeting national and international 
obligations. The 2006-2011 Multi Year Plan was aligned with all relevant national 
documents, as well as with the UNDAF. The process of developing the plan was based 
on consultations with partners on their strategies and capacities. In line with the 
transition plan, the 2006-2011 plan envisaged that all management responsibilities 
would be transferred from the UN to the national mine action authorities by 2011. The 
plan presents the sector response to capacity development, with a focus on two main 
                                                                                                                                                           
b) Assist national authorities to identify appropriate national institutions and develop capacities that can 
meet long term mine action requirements  
33 The United Nations Development Assistance Framework for Sudan 2009-2012, p. 21, http://www.sudan-
map.org/DocDownload/Program/SudanUNDAF.pdf  







1. Planning, coordinating and monitoring. 
2. Quality management.  
 
The main objectives of the plan were to: 
• clarify the gaps in terms of capacities and resources against the defined and 
shared targets 
• make easier the tracking of resources against activities 
• provide more transparency vis-à-vis donors and stakeholders 
• help partners realign their strategies and activities to the common goals 
• improved coordination of tasks 
 
NRMAO staff pointed out that the process of developing the plan and the plan itself was 
significant in creating a stronger sense of ownership among NMAC staff members.  
 
The 2006-2011 plan was followed by the 2010-2014 Multi Year Work Plan35, which, as 
with the first plan, was based on consultations with all actors in the Sudanese mine 
action sector, with UNMAO working closely with their national counterparts. The stated 
purpose of the multi-year work plan is to provide a unified planning document to assist 
with resource mobilisation and planning, within the mine action sector in Sudan.  
 
While the first multi-year plan combined north and south together, apart from in the 
“mine and ERW survey and clearance” section, which was divided between the north, 
the south and Darfur, the multi-year work plan has two distinct sections – one for the 
north and one for the south. The plan includes specific sections for north and south 
respectively, and states how on-the-job training would be the most effective solution to 
address the SSDA’s need to increase practical understanding of the mine action 
management processes.   
 
It is clear that the plan has been a useful document for resource mobilisation, and for 
planning purposes for the Sudanese mine action programme as a whole. While a 
number of NMAC staff highlighted the value of the document, no SSDA staff members 
made any reference to it during meetings for this case study. As to whether or not the 
process of developing the plans resulted in strengthened national capacity, NRMAO 
staff has pointed out that had the involvement of NMAC been greater, the process’ 




                                                    




THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN SUDAN 
The United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1590 was adopted in March 
200536, providing the legal foundation to monitor the implementation of the CPA and to 
establish the UNMIS. UNMIS was mandated by UNSCR 1590 to support the CPA in a 
number of ways, and consisted of 10,000 military personnel and up to 750 civilian police 
personnel.  
 
Article IV of the UNSCR 1590 stipulated that the UNMIS’s mandate would be the 
following: “To assist the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in cooperation 
with other international partners in the mine action sector, by providing humanitarian 
demining assistance, technical advice, and coordination”. 37 The UNSCR 1590 explicitly 
recognised the sovereignty of Sudan. The Sudan Unified Mission Plan38 stated that, in its 
aim to support the Sudanese people in establishing a peaceful and democratic Sudan, 
the overall programme of the UN in Sudan must have “sustainability as its key objective; 
allowing for a gradual shift from international assistance to Sudanese self-reliance, and 
progress that is carried forward by the people and institutions of Sudan”.  
 
The Sudan Unified Mission Plan (the mission plan) stipulated that UNMIS was to oversee 
the work of UNMAS and UNDP, as well as other mine action actors. It further stated that 
“all mine action activities will be integrated into a common United Nations mine action 
program, coordinated by the UNMAS”. The UN Mine Action Office (UNMAO) was 
established with headquarters in Khartoum, and three regional offices in Kadugli (with 
sub-offices in Kassala and Damazin), Juba (with sub-offices in Yei, Wau and Malakal) and 
El Fashir (with sub-offices in El Genina and Nyala).  
 
The mission plan presented three key areas that the UN mine action programme should 
focus on: 
 
1. Surveying potentially contaminated areas countrywide, clearing high and 
medium priority mine and ERW contaminated areas; rehabilitating the most 
serious mine victims, and raising awareness of the mine and ERW situation 
through MRE.  
2. Clearing priority roads to facilitate the deployment of the military and civilian 
police components of the mission. 
3. Developing national capacity through support to the national mine action 
authorities and national non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in both the 
north and the south.  
   
It is important to note in particular point number three, and that the mission plan 
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38 Sudan Unified Mission Plan, UNMIS,  http://www.unsudanig.org/unsudan/data/Sudanper cent20Unifiedper 




explicitly stated capacity development as a key focus area of the UN mine action 
programmes.  
 
The mission plan further presented three distinct phases of the mine action programme. 
While not presenting any timelines for these phases, the mission plan outlined the 
following key activities, for each phase: 
 
1. Route verification, limited clearance, emergency survey/marking, quality 
assurance, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), battle area clearance (BAC), 
targeted MRE, emergency VA and capacity building, address treaty obligations 
and conduct community assessment of the impact of landmines and ERW. 
2. Landmine Impact Survey (LIS), route clearance, clearance of high/medium 
impact areas, quality assurance, national MRE, national VA, capacity building, 
including implementation of transition plan, and establishing a fully operational 
national mine action coordination and implementation capacity.  
3. Complete the transitional plan, develop operational national mine action 
coordination and implementation capacity, and make Sudan mine-impact free.  
 
 
MAINSTREAMING GENDER CONSIDERATIONS IN UNMIS 
The UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security39 calls for gender mainstreaming40 of 
all peacekeeping operations. In response to this, a DPKO gender advisor participated in 
the inter-agency assessment missions conducted prior to the finalisation of the 
mandate for the UNMIS. In light of this, UNSCR 1590 established the UNMIS reaffirmed 
resolution 1325. The UNMIS mission plan reflected the calls of UNSCR 1325, and 
included a specific section on gender, and explicitly stated that “gender perspectives are 
to be integrated effectively in all components of the mission…The mission will aim for its 
policies, programs and activities to comply with international standards on gender 
equality, and will promote gender equality and equity both internally (inside the mission) 
and externally (for the Government of National Unity, Government of Southern Sudan, 
UN agencies and civil society)”. The mission plan further emphasised the need to ensure 
that the discharge of the UNMIS mandate was in accordance with international 
standards, and the UNSCR 1325, which makes an explicit reference to mine action, 
“Emphasising the need for all parties to ensure that mine clearance and mine awareness 
programmes take into account the special needs of women and girls”.  
 
                                                    
39 UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, 2000,  http://www.un.org/events/res_1325e.pdf  
40 Gender mainstreaming refers to “the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned 
action including legislation, policies or programmes in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making the 
concerns and experiences of women and men an integral dimension of design, implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit 
equally and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality” (report of the Economic 




The DPKO’s Under-secretary General’s General Policy Statement on Gender 
Mainstreaming
41 of March 2005 provided an operational framework for implementing 
gender mainstreaming mandates in DPKO’s work. The policy statement requires that all 
peacekeeping functional units design guidelines to facilitate gender mainstreaming. In 
response to this, UNMAS developed the Gender Guidelines for Mine Action, in 2005, 
with an updated version published in 2010. The guidelines present advice on how to 
mainstream gender in the main areas of mine action, highlighting concrete examples 
from affected countries. The extent to which a gender perspective was truly integrated 
into the mine action component of the UNMIS is questionable, and it is evident that the 
gender guidelines for mine action programmes have not been implemented. Many of 
the informants interviewed for this study were not even aware of the guidelines, 
indicating that they have not been disseminated in any meaningful way.  
  
                                                    





HISTORY OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT 
 
UNMAS 
The UN Inter-agency Policy specifies that UNMAS - a division of the DPKO – is the focal 
point for mine action in the UN system. The policy further sets out that in specific 
peacekeeping, complex emergency and rapid response settings, UNMAS can establish 
and manage mine action coordination centres (MACCs). In relation to capacity 
development, UNMAS is mandated to coordinate the planning for the transfer of 
programme management responsibilities to national authorities, and, in cooperation 
with other UN mine action team members, to advise governments on the development 
of mine action institutions and legislation as well as to assist in developing capacity and 
institution building plans.  
 
The 2006 Sudan Mine Action Policy Framework determines the role of UNMAS to be 
that of coordinating mine action activities in collaboration with the national authorities. 
As mentioned above, the Sudan Unified Mission Plan stipulated that UNMAS should 
coordinate all mine action activities, integrated into a common United Nations mine 
action programme. UNMAS have had the dual role of coordinating the UNMAO and 
supporting the UNMIS. In addition to these responsibilities, UNMAS was also in charge 
of administering and supervising contracting procedures for tasks identified by the 
steering committees, comprised of UNMIS, the UN country team and the Sudanese 
Government. UNMAS was also responsible for coordinating the demining assets of the 




UNDP was the lead agency for capacity development in the UNMAO structure, as per 
the Mine Action and Effective Coordination: The United Nations Inter-agency Policy 
document, which stipulates that “The United Nations Development Programme provides 
comprehensive support to national mine action programmes in the full range of mine 
action activities, at the request of mine-affected countries”. 
43
 The UN Inter-Agency 
Policy explicitly states, that; “UNDP capacity development support aims to assist 
national and local authorities to: develop laws, policies and national and sectoral 
strategic plans; deliver all elements of mine action efficiently and to IMAS; establish 
comprehensive information management systems necessary for the efficient planning 
and prioritisation of mine action activities and ensure the quality of mine action 
operations; explore cost-effective alternatives to clearance operations based on 
humanitarian and socio-economic impact analysis; advocate for the inclusion of mine 
action in national development plans; and meet their legal obligations under relevant 
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UNDP’s capacity development activities in Sudan started in early 2004. The first phase 
of the project (2004 – 2008) focused on establishing legislative frameworks, developing 
basic organisational infrastructures, including the set up of head/field offices of NMAC 
and SSDA, as well as training staff members in basic mine action management. The 
second phase of the project (2009 – 2011) aimed to provide comprehensive 
management, technical, material and financial support to the NMAA and the SSDA, to 
consolidate and strengthen their existing institutional, management and technical 
capacities to be able to plan, coordinate, monitor, accredit, quality assure, manage 
information, and implement all other aspects of mine action within the framework of 
the IMAS and the National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSGs). The UNDP mine 
action programme and capacity building project was managed at the national level. 
Under the overall supervision of the UNDP Sudan Country Director, the project was 
executed under UNDP’s direct implementation modality, in both Khartoum and Juba, 
and was located within the Crises Prevention and Recovery unit of UNDP.  
 
A UNDP senior technical advisor was based in Khartoum between 2005 and 2010, where 
he spent time in both the north and the south, overseeing five technical advisors, who 
worked at different times in southern Sudan between 2006 and 2011. The last UNDP 
technical advisor, based in Juba, was on a UN volunteer’s contract. The reason for 
downgrading the position was partly due to funding shortages, and partly due to a 
broader strategy to recruit and place volunteers in various government departments in 
order to develop capacity. The UNDP noted that the high turnover of technical advisors 
in Juba impacted negatively on its ability to effectively provide sustained capacity 
development support to the SSDA. Stated reasons for the high turnover have involved 
the challenging working conditions in Juba and difficult working relationships between 
UNDP and UNMAS personnel.  
 
The 2007 Evaluation of the UNDP Sudan Mine Action Capacity Building and 
Development Project 
45 presents the following four recommendations, addressing the 
requirements for: 
   
1. A realistic long term needs assessment, to provide the basis for: 
a. An appropriate long term strategy for the national mine action 
programme, which will allow: 
b. Realistic plans for further development of Sudanese mine action 
capacities and for transferring responsibilities from the UN to 
national authorities, and finally: 
c. Plans by the international mine action organisations (NGOs as 
well as the UN agencies) for supporting capacity development.  
                                                    
44 Ibid, p. 35  





From August 2011, the UNDP was no longer involved in any capacity development 
activities for the SSDA or the NMAC. Despite numerous efforts, it was not possible to 
obtain an official explanation as to why UNDP ceased its capacity development 
activities. An unofficial explanation pointed to a combination of funding issues and 
clashes between UNMAS and UNDP staff members in Khartoum and at headquarters. A 
former UNDP staff member stated that UNDP “had enough of being constantly 
overruled by the more powerful and resourceful UNMAS”.  
 
 
UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN’S FUND (UNICEF) 
In its role as lead agency for MRE within the UNMAO framework, UNICEF coordinated 
and provided technical support, developed training and promoted best practices. 
UNICEF further supported “the MRE advisory group”, composed of a number of expert 
agencies and individuals who provided guidance to the sector, while identifying ways of 
improving effectiveness, efficiency and relevance of MRE within the broader mine 
action community.  
 
In relation to capacity development, the UN Inter-agency Policy states that; “In all its 
work, UNICEF seeks to build the capacity of its local and international partners to 
undertake effective mine action projects. Consistent with its main focus of work, UNICEF 
works to develop effective mechanisms to coordinate MRE projects, such as establishing 
national MRE working groups, undertakes MRE and associated training activities for 
practitioners, in addition to providing direct technical assistance to government and 
other national partners”.46  
 
A 2007 evaluation of the Sudan mine action programme however, highlighted that 
UNMAS “had to hire” its own MRE advisors to provide support, as a result of a 
perceived “lack of interest” on UNICEF’s part. When UNMAS received funds for MRE, 
the intent was for the funds to be transferred to UNICEF, to hire regional MRE 
coordinators for Kadugli and Juba. The evaluation team further argued that internal 
rules regarding support costs meant that it was not possible for UNICEF to accept the 
funds to hire the two international coordinators. UNMAS then reportedly requested 
UNOPS to hire them for the programme. A UNICEF staff member provided a different 
perspective, pointing out that a lack of interest was not an issue, but that the UNMAS 
negotiated terms and conditions made the transfer of funds to UNICEF impossible. 
UNICEF further mentioned that UNMAS hired two regional coordinators, despite 
concerns raised by UNICEF, and that the subsequent arrangement was worked out as a 
compromise.  
 
UNOPS recruited the two regional MRE coordinators in 2005, and in order to ensure 
coordination of the MRE programme throughout the country, UNOPS and UNICEF 
                                                    




agreed that the UNICEF MRE coordinator in Khartoum would coordinate the activities of 
the two MRE regional coordinators. UNICEF had been providing an MRE coordinator to 
the UNMAO office in Khartoum since April 2005, but the coordinator reported both to 
the UNMAO programme manager and the UNICEF chief of child protection. This dual 
reporting obligation was described as a “confusing arrangement” by the coordinator. 
 
UNICEF had a close collaboration with NMAC’s MRE department in Khartoum, with the 
coordinator actively involved in developing the MRE element of the transition plan.  
 
At the time of writing, UNICEF supported two international and eight national NGOs 
financially, to provide MRE activities in southern Sudan. In collaboration with the SSDA, 
UNICEF also supported the printing of a “teacher’s guide”, which is integrated into the 
primary educational curriculum.  UNICEF has further provided logistical support to the 
SSDA in the form of vehicles to regional offices and the Juba head office, as well as 
laptops, a projector, and digital cameras.  UNICEF also supports the SSDA through joint 




INTERNATIONALLY ORGANISED MINE ACTION MANAGER TRAINING 
COURSES 
Many of the middle and senior managers at NMAC and SSDA have participated in one or 
more of the internationally organised mine action manager training courses provided at 
Cranfield University (UK), James Madison University (USA) and Amman University 
(Jordan).  Many of the NMAC and SSDA staff members rated the courses and the value 
created by interacting with colleagues from other mine action programmes, sharing 
lessons learnt and good practices. A number of international staff however, questioned 
if these courses really add any value.   
 
Cranfield Mine Action, part of the Centre for International Security and Resilience within 
Cranfield University, has been providing a range of training courses for national 
managers in order to develop national capacity to enable the Sudan MAP achieve 
national ownership in a timely manner. The most recent course, conducted in April 
2010, included training on applied quality management, mine action project 
management, resource mobilisation, and process improvement. Recipients of the 
training included representatives from NMAC, SSDA, as well as Sudanese national NGOs.  
 
While it is beyond the scope of this study to assess the effectiveness of internationally 
organised mine action training courses, a number of evaluations have been carried out, 
including one commissioned by the GICHD in 2007.47 
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TRANSITION TO NATIONAL OWNERSHIP 
THE TRANSITION PLANNING PROCESS 
In response to the updated 2006 Mine Action Strategic Framework’s strategic goal no. 6, 
to develop and implement a transitional plan in order to facilitate the transition of mine 
action management from the UN to national authorities, UNMAS - through UNOPS - 
recruited a transition planning officer in late 2007. The officer’s key responsibilities 
included developing a transition plan and an exit strategy in consultation with national 
authorities, and managing “the whole transition process”, from the development of a 
plan to its implementation, in close cooperation with other stakeholders.  
 
TRANSITION PLANNING WORKSHOPS AND PLANS 
The transition planning officer initiated the formal transition planning process, with 
support from Cranfield University, with a first transition workshop organised in Nairobi 
in late February 2008. This was behind the timeline set out in the strategic framework, 
which stipulated that the UNMAO and the NMAA “shall jointly develop and endorse a 
transitional plan, including clear milestones by December 2006”.  
 
A “transition framework” was developed at the Nairobi workshop, identifying a number 
of functions and components.48 The intention was for the framework to be used to map 
the different actions and capabilities of the NMAC and the SSDA. Additional work on the 
transition framework was carried out by the transition planning team, based in 
Khartoum and Juba, through the identification of key elements of national ownership, 
the identification of a number of core components for each element, and the 
development of criteria for national ownership for each component.  
 
A second workshop was held in Nairobi in May 2008, at which a monitoring tool to track 
levels of national ownership was developed, and an agreement on developing transition 
action plans was made. The third transition workshop in Khartoum in August 2008 took 
stock of progress made in developing the action plans to support the transition to full 
national ownership. After this workshop, it was agreed that transition should be 
approached with the ten core management responsibilities of a mine action programme 
as a starting point: 
 
1. Plan, coordinate, monitor and oversee all aspects of mine action. 
2. Prioritise, task and authorise all mine action activities. 
3. Accredit mine action organisations, in accordance with the NTSGs, prior to 
authorisation of mine action activities. 
4. Quality manage all mine action activities. 
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5. Revise NTSGs according to in-country needs and conditions, that all concerned 
are obliged to adhere. 
6. Maintain the integrity of the IMSMA. 
7. Mobilise necessary funds from national and international sources to achieve 
mine action strategic goals. 
8. Coordinate and manage the implementation of MRE to communities at risk on a 
priority basis. 
9. NMAC shall coordinate and manage the implementation of mine victims 
assistance to ensure physical and psycho-social and economic rehabilitation and 
reintegration of landmines/ERW victims and survivors.  
10. Ensure that Sudan honours its obligations under the Ottawa Mine Ban Treaty 
and other relevant treaties. 
 
A fourth transition meeting was held in Juba in November 2008, with the key objective 
of presenting the transition plan, agreeing its structure and the relationship between 
transition and capacity development, and discussing its implementation and activities in  
2009 and beyond. The importance of monitoring and evaluating capacity development 
training activities was also agreed upon. The participants further decided that a 
memorandum of understanding between the UN and the NMAA should be developed, 
and that the starting point for the implementation of the transition plan should be 1 
January 2009.  
 
The fifth transition workshop was held for two days in Khartoum in May 2010. Cranfield 
University assisted with facilitating the workshop, and representatives from UNMAO, 
UNOPS, NMAC and SSDA participated.  
 
Participants were divided into two separate groups - NMAC staff members and their 
UNMAO counterparts in one, and SSDA staff members and their UNMAO counterparts 
in the other. The two groups first worked separately, reviewing progress made in 
relation to the level of national ownership in the various elements as set out in the 2008 
transition plan, and then got back together for general discussions and reporting. The 
workshop was essentially structured around the following five areas:  
 
1. “Where were we before?” December 2008 levels of national ownership in the 
three main areas: clearance, MRE and VA 
2. “Where are we now? Current operational plan until June 2011”. 
3. Transitioning the ten core management responsibilities. 
4. Performance indicators. 





The workshop is summarised in a “fifth transition report”. The fifth transition plan49 
presented nine core management responsibilities instead of ten: 
 
1. Plan, coordinate, monitor and oversee all aspects of mine action. 
2. Prioritise, task and authorise all mine action activities. 
3. Revise the NTSGs according to in-country needs and conditions to which all 
concerned are obliged to adhere. 
4. Manage the quality of all mine action activities. 
5. Accredit mine action organisations in accordance with NTSGs, prior to 
authorisation of mine action activities. 
6. Maintain the integrity of IMSMA. 
7. Mobilise necessary funds from national and international sources to achieve 
mine action strategic goals. 
8. Ensure that Sudan honours its obligations under the Ottawa Treaty and other 
relevant treaties. 
9. Plan, coordinate and manage all aspects of support service elements of a mine 
action programme. 
 
As can be seen, the previous core management responsibilities related to coordination 
and implementation of MRE activities (previously responsibility No. 8), and to 
coordinating and managing the implementation of victim assistance were deleted, while 
the additional responsibility of planning, coordinating and managing support services 
was added.  
 
The fifth transition plan was divided into the above mentioned nine core management 
responsibilities of the Sudan MAP. These responsibilities were referred to as 
“elements”, which were subdivided into components; each of the elements was divided 
into a common structure, outlined and described; then an end-state for that specific 
component was presented.  
 
The report presented five levels of national ownership for each component, with level 0 
corresponding to no national capacity to carry out responsibilities, and level 4 
corresponding to the highest level of national ownership. The reader could also see at 
which level of national ownership the MAP was set in 2008 (indicated in orange), and 
which level it was believed the programme had reached in 2010 (indicated in blue).  
 
Following a description of the different levels of national ownership, there was a 
summary of the situation in June 2010, followed by an outline of activities deemed 
necessary in order for the NMAC/SSDA to reach the next level of national ownership. 
Each component ended with an estimate of which level of ownership the NMAC/SSDA 
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would reach one year later (June 2011).   
THE TRANSITION AND CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT PROCESS: 
NORTHERN SUDAN 
Following the third transition workshop in 2008, the first transition matrix was jointly 
developed by the northern region mine action office (NRMAO), the UNDP and NMAC. 
The development of the matrix was seen as necessary, as it was generally believed that 
the transition plan was too complex, complicated and academic to be practically 
workable.  
 
The matrix set out specific timelines in relation to what needed to be achieved, and it 
stipulated the specific responsibilities of the various actors involved, highlighting 
concrete activities that had to be undertaken in order to reach the goals. It is believed 
that the development of this transition matrix made the capacity development process 
less academic and theoretical, concretely highlighting instead what needed to be 
achieved, by when, how, and who should be responsible. This was an important shift in 
the capacity development process – from an academic approach to a more practical and 
pragmatic approach, one that was more easily understood by all stakeholders involved. 
The shift to a more pragmatic approach strengthened the relationship between NRMAO 
and NMAC, as NMAC became increasingly involved in quality assurance visits.  
 
Many NMAC respondents indicated that the transition process was unclear to them 
prior to the May 2010 fifth transition (T5) workshop. It is worth pointing out however, 
that very few of the NMAC and NRMAO staff that participated in the workshop had 
been involved in the earlier transition activities of 2008. Some staff members remarked 
that they doubted transition “would ever happen”. However, all NMAC and NRMAO 
respondents pointed out that the workshop was a “great success”, remarking how the 
workshop resulted in a “much clearer” picture of the activities that were necessary for 
the transition to national ownership to successfully take place. Staff members further 
underlined that the workshop strengthened the relationship and level of trust between 
NMAC and NRMAO, providing a strong foundation for closer collaboration between the 
two organisations. It is evident that the T5 represented a key event in the 
transition/capacity development process.  
 
Subsequent to the T5 transition plan, a matrix of transitional activities was developed 
jointly by NMAC and NRMAO staff. The matrix presented the various pillars, activities, 
what elements of the transition plan the activities corresponded to, the individual(s) 
responsible, and deadlines. The matrix was an essential document, as it made more 
concrete the transition plan, clearly presenting the activities which were needed for 
each area, and importantly, indicating who was responsible for which activity, by when. 





CORE FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITIES OF THE NMAC 
Mine Risk Education Department 
The MRE department was consulted in the drafting process of the transition plan, and 
staff members remarked that capacity development was only really initiated as a 
structured process with the T5 transition plan. Respondents from the MRE department 
pointed out that high staff turnover represented an initial challenge for the department 
up to 2009, and that this negatively impacted on its capacity level.   
 
From mid-2010, the MRE department has had close collaboration with NRMAO, with 
one NMAC MRE staff member working at the NRMAO office. Key capacity development 
activities carried out until late 2010 included joint NRMAO – NMAC teacher training 
activities and field trips, “learning by doing” through in-house training, participation at 
international meetings, and attending international training courses.  
 
Both NMAC and NRMAO staff members remarked that the January 2011 collocation of 
NRMAO at NMAC improved NMAC’s general skills tremendously, mainly as a result of: 
 
• on-the-job training 
• strengthened coordination 
• improved information sharing  
• day-to-day discussions and interactions 
 
NMAC successfully chairs the MRE working group on a monthly basis at the NMAC 
premises, highlighted as a key achievement. A multi-year work plan was developed 
jointly by NMAC, NRMAO and UNICEF, with the intention of serving as a planning 
document post-June 2011. NMAC co-tasked all MRE activities in collaboration with 
NRMAO, and an NMAC signature on all tasking documents was made obligatory.  
 
The T5 transition plan set out five different elements for the MRE department, some 
with corresponding subcomponents, nine in total. The level of national ownership was 
fairly balanced among the nine components, with most of them seeing national 
ownership at level two or three. Key activities included training in the following areas:  
 
• external reporting responsibilities 
• survey and needs assessment methodologies 
• data analysis techniques 
• prioritisation processes 
• proposal writing  
• planning capacity 
 
While the MRE capacity at NMAC in Khartoum is generally regarded as strong, with two 




no MRE capacities in the sub-offices, due to a lack of qualified staff members. 
Recognising this, NMAC head office identified a number of activities aimed at 
strengthening capacity at the sub-offices, where NMAC staff usually travel on a more 
frequent basis. However, issues such as a lack of fuel and functional vehicles regularly 
represent key challenges to this. Limited commitment from relevant ministries involved 
in MRE was also underlined as a key constraint. Other significant challenges related to 
fundraising, and the sustainability of activities.  
 
While NMAC’s MRE department expressed a keen interest in mainstreaming gender 
considerations, and showed a fairly high level of awareness of gender aspects related to 
MRE, the staff were not aware of UN’s Gender Guidelines for Mine Action 
Programmes.50 It appears that these guidelines have not been disseminated in any of 
NMAC’s departments.  
Victim Assistance Department 
The victim assistance (VA) programme was established at the NMAC headquarters in 
2007, through funding from the human security trust fund. NRMAO and NMAC have 
worked in parallel since its initiation. NMAC works closely with the Ministry of Social 
Welfare and Social Security, which is the ministry officially in charge of VA and broader 
disability issues in Sudan.  NRMAO and NMAC were instrumental in advising on the VA 
part of the national strategic framework in 2007.  
 
NMAC, in close collaboration with NRMAO, established the VA working group, which 
consists of 18 NGOs. This working group meets once a month. As of mid-2011, there 
were three VA staff members at NMAC, but no capacity at the subregional level. A grant 
from CIDA provided the bulk of the funding from 2008 to June 2011.  
 
A key aspect of capacity development activities has been on-the-job training, carried out 
by the collocated NRMAO VA expert. Needs assessment activities concluded that 
training was needed in the following areas: Technical writing with a focus on planning, 
resource mobilisation, monitoring and evaluation and reporting. Since these areas were 
of relevance to other NMAC departments, joint training sessions were organised with a 
number of departments. A key area of attention in the capacity development process 
has been on the information management cycle, focusing on data collection, storage, 
quality assurance and analysis.  
 
 
Key achievements of the VA department include:  
 
• successfully organising workshops related to the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) at state level  
                                                    





• developing and using a questionnaire to evaluate and monitor outcomes of VA 
projects at the beneficiary level (presently elaborating a M&E system)  
• drafting and disseminating annual and quarterly VA reports  
• a VA victim registration form has been developed and the database has been 
developed, verified and is working  
• victim data has successfully been entered into the database, which is currently in 
use   
• data has been collected from NGOs and rehabilitations centres, with the aim of 
centralising all VA data in a database 
• being fully in charge of reporting obligations under Article 7 of the APMBC  
 
It is important to note that responsibilities related to VA activities will eventually be 
taken over by the Ministry of Social Welfare, incorporating victim assistance into the 
broader disability programme. This is in line with paragraph 13 of Article IV of the 
Cartagena Action Plan, which stipulates that “victim assistance should be integrated into 
broader national policies, plans and legal frameworks related to disability, health, 
education, employment, development and poverty reduction, while placing particular 
emphasis on ensuring that mine victims have access to specialised services when needed 
and can access on an equal basis services available to the wider population”. 
Support Department 
As mentioned above, participants at the T5 workshop recognised that support services 
were not reflected in the transition plan, resulting in the inclusion of one additional key 
management component - “support services”. It was agreed that support services 
should include administration, logistics, finance, resource mobilisation, IT and external 
relations. Element 9 of the transition plan set out that “NMAC shall plan, coordinate and 
manage all aspects of support service elements of a mine action programme in northern 
Sudan”.  
 
Key activities to develop capacity in NMAC’s logistics department included:  
 
• training the logistics officer in rules and regulations of donors in relation to 
procurement, asset and fleet management 
• establish logistical systems (database, stock taking, asset management, fuel 
monitoring, request systems and internal auditing systems) 
• attaching the NMAC logistics officer to the UNMAO logistics department 
 
In addition to these activities, the development initiative (TDI) seconded a consultant to 
NMAC’s logistics department through the NRMAO. Upon the establishment of the 
logistics department and the arrival of the TDI consultant, the set-up of a vehicle 
management system and asset tracking were made key priorities. Issues related to 
effective and efficient fleet management were highlighted by staff members working in 




related to NMAC’s capacity to cope with a large number of additional vehicles upon the 
closure of UNMAO in June 2011, as well as the lack of funds to insure them.  
 
In relation to the administration component of support services, the following activities 
were carried out in order to strengthen capacity and to prepare for national ownership:  
 
• reviewing NMAC’s organisational chart, and all staff members’ ToRs  
• conducting on-the-job training in administration  
• Human Resources auditing and reporting (NRMAO staff worked closely with 
NMAC staff in these areas)  
 
Key activities deemed necessary for strengthening the finance element of support 
services included NRMAO advising on relevant procedures to meet international audit 
requirements. Building trust among international donors in order to ensure sustained 
funding was mentioned as an important task for NMAC. 
Information Management Department 
The sixth element of the core management responsibilities as stated in the transition 
plan relates to Information Management: “Maintain the integrity of Information 
Management System Mine Action (IMSMA)”. The Information Management (IM) 
element was mainstreamed into the clearance, MRE and VA pillars of the transition 
plan. The T5 report states that IMSMA was one of the “most disputed” topics during the 
T5 workshop. The T5 report also highlights that “…IMSMA is the only category where 
everyone agreed there is a real problem”. One of the key explanations for this was that 
the capacity development process had been initiated late in the IMSMA department. In 
light of these challenges, participants at the T5 workshop agreed that NMAC’s IMSMA 
department should be more closely integrated into the NRMAO’s IMSMA activities, and 
it was believed that the merging of NMAC and NRMAO during the next demining season 
would significantly strengthen NMAC’s level of capacity in the area. NRMAO’s IMSMA 
technical advisor highlighted one key recommendation during the T5 workshop: The IM 
national staff from NRMAO should be transferred to the mine action authorities during 
the transition period.  
 
Staff members in the IMSMA department pointed out that it was not very clear what 
the capacity development and transition goals were in 2008. On-the-job training 
activities were initiated in 2009 however, and the capacity development and transition 
goals became clearer in 2010. Since March 2011, the main focus of the on-the-job 
training within the department has been on the “IMSMA package”. A NRMAO IMSMA 
expatriate staff member acted as an advisor to the NMAC IMSMA department. A 
considerable part of the on-the-job training was carried out through an experienced 
Sudanese NRMAO IMSMA staff member, working closely with NMAC. This strategy was 
proven to be highly successful, as cultural and linguistic aspects made the collaboration 





Despite improvements however, the NRMAO and NMAC IMSMA staff members 
expressed that “more time is needed for confidence building”. On-the-job training 
focused, among other things, on the “customisation” of IMSMA to the future needs of 
the country, if necessary; “training the trainer” activities were also carried out, to 
ensure that NMAC’s IMSMA department has the ability to train newly recruited IMSMA 
staff members as well as other NMAC staff members in IMSMA.  
 
IM and IMSMA were pointed out to be “very much integrated into operations”, with 
IMSMA staff members working closely with the operations and MRE departments. The 
NRMAO technical advisor, pointed out that the capacity development work was “very 
time- consuming”, and that it often was challenging to find the right balance of “doing 
training and running the show”. The technical advisor further mentioned that it would 
be premature for all UN support to be terminated with the closure of UNMAO in June 
2011, highlighting a need for continued external support in relation to guidance, 
technical assistance and monitoring of progress.  
 
The availability of sex and age disaggregated accident data is a precondition for enabling 
the identification and awareness of the distinct exposure to risks that women, girls, 
boys and men commonly face due to their gender specific roles and responsibilities. This 
information can in turn allow for MRE activities to be more effectively tailored and 
targeted. As a state party to the APMBC, Sudan has committed to collect and analyse all 
data in a sex and age disaggregated manner by the Cartagena Action Plan’s action point 
number 25.51 The information management department displayed a high level of 
awareness of the importance of storing and presenting data in a sex and age 




As of June 2011, NMAC’s operations department comprised a total of eight staff 
members, including three from the NRMAO, collocated in its office. The department 
highlighted the goals of full ownership and Sudan meeting its APMBC Article 5 clearance 
obligations at the 2010 T5 workshop. It was noted that although transition to national 
ownership would mean that the UN would play a supporting rather than implementing 
role, continued UN presence at the NMAC, providing technical assistance and resource 
mobilisation would be critical for the continued capacity development of NMAC. 
 
In order to structure the capacity development activities, the operations department 
developed a plan of action, outlining timelines, milestones and indicating which 
individuals were responsible for what activities.  
                                                    






Key focus areas of capacity development at the operations department included: 
 
1. Prioritisation 
a. NMAC co-chaired the prioritisation process for the 2010 – 2011 season 
b. All three sub-offices took the lead in the prioritisation process at the sub-
office level for the 2010-2011 work plan 
 
2. Tasking 
a. NMAC increased its involvement in tasking procedures from 1 January 
2011, through directly tasking implementing agencies 
b. The NMAC operations office took full responsibility of tasking procedures 
from 1 April 2011, with technical assistance from NRMAO 
 
3. National technical standards and guidelines (NTSGs) 
a. NTSGs were reviewed and adapted to country specific requirements in 
October 2010, and were published on the Sudan MAP website 
 
4. Accreditation 
a. Indicators, outlining to what percentage NMAC should be involved in 
accreditation and quality assurance activities were agreed upon, and an 
“accreditation schedule” was completed and shared with sub-offices 
 
Three NRMAO operations staff members were collocated with the NMAC operations 
department in January 2011. From January on, NMAC’s operations officer worked very 
closely with NRMAO’s regional operations coordinator, gradually taking on more 
responsibilities. Capacity development aspects were included in the NRMAO regional 
operations coordinator’s ToR, but was not a key focus of his work, as he mainly 
supported the activities of UNMIS. 
 
NMAC operation’s staff recalled that it was only when the collocation of NRMAO with 
NMAC took place that the “real transition” started, underlying the need for continuing 
technical assistance, and that the exchange of experience is key. Planning and 
contracting were highlighted as areas in need of continued capacity development 
through practical experience and on-the-job training.  
 
It is worth noting that NMAC and NRMAO were collocated from the very beginning of 
the establishment of the Kassala sub-office in 2006. The successful collocation at the 
sub-regional level influenced the push for the collocation of NRMAO with NMAC at 
headquarters level in Khartoum. The NMAC Kassala sub-office was “running on its own” 
from early 2011, with one expatriate staff member providing technical assistance when 
needed. The NRMAO Damazin sub-office was located within the UNMIS base. NMAC 




from on-the job training and technical assistance.  
 
Key operational challenges for a post-transition NMAC were pointed out to include 
tasking, monitoring and quality assurance and control. It was further mentioned that 
the NMAC budget, as of June 2011, only covered office and some of the salary costs, 
and no operational activities related to tasking, monitoring and quality assurance and 
control. A 2012 grant that has been issued to NMAC will reportedly cover these gaps. 
The salary discrepancy between UNMAO and NMAC national staff was highlighted as a 
key challenge in absorbing staff with relevant technical skills and qualifications into 
NMAC.  
 
One example clearly illustrates this discrepancy: A UNMAO national operations quality 
assurance (QA) assistant, level 3, receives a monthly salary, all inclusive of about 2,900 
Sudanese Pounds, while the equivalent position at NMAC receives a monthly salary of 
SDG 1,000. Not only was it difficult to absorb UNMAO staff members with relevant 
experience and knowledge, but the salary discrepancy also resulted in difficulties in 
retaining them; “it is impossible to retain trained staff at NMAC”. 
In terms of the extent of the contamination, the operations department pointed out it 
has an up-to-date and accurate understanding of it, and that a strategic plan is in place 
to implement its mine clearance obligations under Article 5 by 2014.  
As regards the residual contamination, NMAC noted that the plan is for the SAF to deal 
with it. Discussions between NMAC, NRMAO and MAG resulted in an agreement on 
NMAC establishing a mine action hotline number 1912 (free of charge, similar to 999), 
from 1 January 2012.52 Community members can call the hotline number whenever 
they come across any landmine/ERW contamination. The hotline phone number is 
based at the NMAC, and will cover all of Sudan, it is funded by MAG and managed by 
NMAC. It can be dialled from all mobile networks operating in Sudan and is free of 
charge. Every call will be received and registered by NMAC, and calls reporting a mine, 
an item of unexploded ordnance, or any suspicious object, as well as reports of mine 
related accidents, will be passed to the field offices that will take appropriate actions to 
identify the threat and task relevant assets to eliminate it. 
With regards to national clearance capacities, the JIDUs (part of the Joint Integrated 
Units (JIU)) were created as a result of the signing of the CPA and include deminers from 
southern and northern Sudan. These deminers were initially seconded from the army 
but then came under the supervision of the High Commission for Mine Action (a group 
of ministries led by the Humanitarian Affairs Commission). They were trained at the 
Nairobi training centre as humanitarian deminers and equipped with the necessary 
equipment. The JIDUs were closely integrated into NMAC from 2009 onwards. 
 
The JIDU were given a desk accreditation as an integrated mine clearance team (IMCT) 
                                                    




by UNMAO in 2010, followed by an operational accreditation and a test field, funded by 
the British Embassy in Khartoum.  As a result of the accreditation, there has been an 
increased interest among previous donors to continue the support they had previously 
provided and help create a sustainable humanitarian demining capacity capable of 
conducting independent mine clearance operations that comply with IMAS.  
 
The JIDUs were provided by the CPA and, as such, ceased to exist on 9 July 2011. They 
were renamed the National Demining Units (NDUs) after July 2011, and they continue 
carrying out humanitarian demining, coordinated by the Humanitarian Affairs Ministry 
as and when funds are available.  
 
The Way Ahead 
Following the end of the UNMIS mandate as per UNSCR 199753 in July 2011, the 
UNMAO concluded its activities in Sudan. At the request of the GoS, UNMAS continued 
providing assistance to mine action in Sudan through technical support to NMAC.  
Following the termination of UNMIS and the closure of UNMAO, the main activity of 
UNMAS in Sudan (UNMAS-S) is to continue assisting the NMAC in the implementation of 
mine action activities in the country, to promote the humanitarian and developmental 
goals of the government.  
The current areas of assistance are inline with the Sudan Mine Action Programme Multi-
Year Work Plan and the transition plan. NMAC and the Humanitarian Affairs 
Commission have identified, through the transition planning process initiated in 2008 
that the main competencies where the NMAC would like continued UN support are:  
 
• operations and quality assurance 
• IMSMA 
• MRE  
• resource mobilisation  
 
Support will continue, based on a regular monitoring and evaluation system agreed 
upon with NMAC. 
 
INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS INVOLVED IN THE CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT 
PROCESS IN NORTHERN SUDAN 
The Danish Church Aid  
As previously mentioned,  DCA was the first international operator involved in clearance 
in Sudan in 2002, from the very beginning working in close partnership with national 
                                                    





organisations JASMAR (the Sudanese association for combating landmines) and 
Operation Save Innocent Lives (OSIL). The first ever cross-border demining training 
course, organised by DCA, was attended by JASMAR and OSIL.  
 
JASMAR and OSIL were DCA’s implementing clearance partners until 2005, when 
significant financial and organisational challenges resulted in DCA taking over all 
clearance teams from the two national organisations. DCA pointed out that JASMAR and 
OSIL were struggling to establish themselves as fully independent NGOs, and that OSIL 
in particular was very poorly funded. While the national organisations may have had a 
good level of technical capacity in terms of clearance, DCA highlighted that they lacked 
capacity in other areas that are essential for an organisation to operate independently, 
such as finance and logistics.  
 
Both JASMAR and OSIL had MRE teams working directly with the DCA since 2003 up to 
2011. These teams were working closely with DCA’s multi-task teams, providing 
community liaison (CL) and MRE support during clearance operations.  
 
In addition to the above activities, DCA provided capacity development support to 
JASMAR, in the form of logistical, finance and English language training. DCA also 
provided vehicles and IT equipment, as well as financial contributions to JASMAR. DCA 
staff pointed out that JASMAR had increasingly developed into a self-sustained NGO, 
and that improvements in the running of the organisation were very evident.  
 
Association for Aid and Relief, Japan  
The Association for Aid and Relief Japan (AAR) started its activities in Sudan in 2006, and 
has had a partnership agreement from the very beginning with the Sudanese 
organisation Friends of Peace and Development Organisation (FPDO). AAR and FPDO 
initially focused their activities on developing MRE material. AAR opened a sub-office in 
Kadugli, South Kordofan in 2007, and started developing MRE sessions. AAR shared this 
office with the FPDO from the very beginning, and FPDO delivered MRE on an 
independent basis.  
 
AAR has highlighted that it focused its capacity development activities with the FPDO in 
the following areas: 
 
• MRE training 
• IT skills 
• administrative related work  
 
AAR also conducted workshops and gave trainings to other national NGOs, with a 
specific focus on material development. AAR provided training to a staff member at the 




three days per week.   
 
In terms of FPDO’s general level of capacity, AAR has pointed out that it is “quite good”, 
and the main capacity challenges are reported to be in the administrative and financial 
areas.  
 
Mines Advisory Group  
While not having had any formal capacity development activities with NMAC, the Mines 
Advisory Group (MAG) did focus on strengthening the capacity of its clearance teams, 
with the long term view of “handing them over” to its national partner organisation 
JASMAR. Leaders of the various clearance teams underwent training to be certified at 
EOD level 3, and MAG also conducted an EOD level 2 training course in Khartoum in 
August 2011. There were 23 staff members from JASMAR/MAG, the NDU and the NMAC 
who became certified at EOD level 2. Medical training was also provided to seven 
medics, qualifying them to provide emergency medical support for Humanitarian Mine 
Action (HMA) operations.   
 
MAG signed a memorandum of understanding with the NDU in May 2010, following 
from which five deminers were seconded to MAG to be trained and accredited as a 
multi-task team. The team was trained in manual clearance, BAC, and technical and 
non-technical survey. Soon after, a second team was seconded to MAG to be trained in 
the operation and maintenance of a Bozena IV mechanical asset and mechanical 
preparation techniques. The team has since also been trained and accredited in the use 
of mechanical assets. Based on the successes of MAG’s partnership with the NDUs,  
 
MAG has also run CL and MRE projects with JASMAR, as well as providing training and 
support for its programme staff. JASMAR seconded CL staff to MAG to benefit from the 
expertise provided by MAG’s technical team, and MAG benefitted greatly from 
JASMAR’s extensive experience delivering MRE projects in the region. In May 2011, the 
national community liaison manager and MAG/JASMAR MRE trainer were sent on a 
programme learning and exchange visit to Lebanon, where they shared constraints, 
achievements and lessons learned with both MAG’s Lebanese programme, and the 





TRANSITION AND CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT PROCESS: SOUTHERN 
SUDAN 
THE SSDA 
The Southern Sudan Demining Authority (SSDA) is responsible for: 
 
• broad strategic policy decisions 
• responsibilities that are usually associated with a NMAA 
• for overseeing mine action at the operational level 
• for managing day-to-day mine action activities, a role commonly associated with 
a mine action centre (MAC)  
 
IMAS 02.10, the Guide for the establishment of a mine action programme54 clearly 
describes the responsibilities of these different authorities, and recommends a clear 
division of the two. SSDA has three sub-regional offices, located in Malakal in Upper Nile 
State, Yei in Central Equatoria State, and in Wau in Western Bhar El- Ghazal. Most 
respondents noted that the capacity is very low in these sub-offices, and it was pointed 
out that they are severely under-resourced in terms of staff and equipment. 
  
TRANSITION TEAM 
Following the news that UNDP would cease its mine action activities, UNMAS initiated 
the idea of creating a transition team in 2010. The principal aim was to implement the 
transition plan and to carry out capacity development activities with SSDA. The 
transition team, as of June 2011 was made up of representatives from three different 
organisations: UNMAS, NPA and UNDP.  
 
As from mid-2010, two staff members from the UNMAO team were directly involved in 
capacity development: one UNDP UN volunteer (UNV) who was permanently located at 
the SSDA premises, and one UNMAS technical advisor, who spent considerable time 
working with SSDA’s senior management team. Together with the NPA capacity 
development team (consisting of two expatriate staff and two national staff), these staff 
members represented the “transition team”.  Key responsibilities and activities were 
agreed upon by the transition team members. It was further decided which key external 
partners the various transition team members were “responsible for”, and each 
transition team member was assigned a SSDA counterpart.  
 
THE T5 WORKSHOP 
The slow progress of capacity development/transition efforts in southern Sudan is in 
                                                    






sharp contrast to that of northern Sudan. This can be explained by a number of factors, 
including lower levels of education among the population, poorer infrastructure and 
greater impacts of the conflict at all levels of society.   
 
While the T5 workshop, held in Khartoum in May 2010, was hailed a “success” by most 
UNMAO and NMAC representatives, a distinctively different perspective was given by 
SSDA staff members and other southern Sudanese participants. Recognising the “one 
country approach” stated in the CPA and other key documents, the reasons for 
organising the T5 workshop in Khartoum, bringing southern and northern stakeholders 
together, are understandable. It is, however, evident that the format of the T5 
workshop resulted in problems. Numerous southern Sudanese T5 participants were 
highly critical of the workshop, and of the fact that it was organised in Khartoum.  
 
One senior SSDA staff member referred to the T5 workshop as a politically driven 
“window dressing” activity - adding little real value to SSDA’s capacity development and 
transition process. Another senior SSDA staff member highlighted that T5 was a 
“success” for the north, but a “disaster” for the south. One senior UNMAS staff member 
who worked at the UNMAO head office at the time pointed out that the combination of 
new senior staff members at UNMAO in Juba, limited resources, and the politically 
driven motives linked with the “one country approach”, resulted in the decision to 
conduct the T5 workshop jointly in Khartoum. Recognising the shortcomings of this 
decision, however, the same staff member also confessed that “in hindsight, it was a 
mistake to have north and south together”. When asked about the accuracy of the 
levels of national ownership agreed upon in Khartoum, this same staff member 
remarked that they “didn’t want to wash the dirty laundry in public”, presumably 
referring to the fact that the low level of capacity at the SSDA was overlooked.  
 
THE T5 TRANSITION PLAN 
There was a lot of criticism on the T5 transition plan. Firstly, many pointed the great 
delay in its completion, and that it was not made available to the SSDA (nor the NMAC) 
until February 2011, despite the workshop taking place in May 2010. One senior SSDA 
staff member argued that the transition plan was “mainly an UNMAO document”, with 
very little consultation from SSDA staff members besides the chairperson. According to 
him, the chairperson was the only one “who was allowed to talk” during the T5 
workshop, resulting in the subsequent transition plan being based on “assumptions” – 
not accurately reflecting the reality in southern Sudan.  
 
Another senior SSDA staff member pointed out that “how the transition plan stipulates 
the capacity development and transition process does not happen on the ground”. A 
senior UNMAO staff member working in Juba at the time pointed out that about a 
dozen SSDA staff members attended the T5 workshop, and that a meeting was 




Khartoum. At this meeting, it turned out that SSDA staff did not agree with much that 
had been decided at the T5, resulting in an additional four meetings. The UNMAO staff 
member highlighted that these four meetings resulted in an “as close to agreed 
language as we could get”. It was further underlined that the considerable delay in 
drafting and distributing the T5 transition plan lead to SSDA “buying out”, to a large 
extent disassociating themselves from what had been agreed.  
 
Another key criticism raised by many was the lack of indicators for the different levels of 
national ownership, at times resulting in highly subjective interpretations of what the 
different levels mean.  
 
Likewise, expatriate representatives who were involved in the capacity development 
process believe the plan had serious limitations. For instance, one individual argued that 
the transition plan essentially was a “political document”, while explicitly pointing out 
the problems related to lack of indicators. Echoing criticism from SSDA staff members, a 
number of expatriates pointed out that the transition plan was not realistic, and that it 
was difficult to use in a practical way. The T5 transition plan and the corresponding 
process have been criticised by some individuals as being “too academic” and “too 
theoretical” – not “tailored to the reality” of the Sudan mine action programme.  
 
Information obtained from respondents involved in the transition process clearly 
indicates that the T5 transition plan was not actively implemented in southern Sudan. 
None of the individuals interviewed during the research mentioned they had actually 
used the transition plan. One SSDA staff member argued that the lack of 
implementation of the transition plan was the result of “a lack of cooperation between 
the SSDA and UNMAO”.  
 
THE SIXTH TRANSITION WORKSHOP 
As per clause 2.555 of the CPA, an internationally monitored referendum, organised 
jointly by the GoS and the SPLA/M provided the women and men of southern Sudan 
with the opportunity to either confirm the unity of Sudan by voting to adopt the system 
of government established under the CPA or to vote for secession. The referendum took 
place as scheduled on 9 January 2011, and the results that were published on 7 
February 2011 showed that an overwhelming majority (98.83 per cent) voted in favour 
of secession. The vote for secession and the subsequent independence of southern 
Sudan, declared on 9 July 2011, effectively terminates the interim arrangements, agreed 
to by the NCP and the SPLA/M through the signing of the CPA.  
 
The sixth transition workshop (T6) was held in Juba in June 2011. Following the outcome 
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of the referendum in southern Sudan, the workshop focused exclusively on the 
transition process in southern Sudan. NMAC and UNMAO representatives were 
therefore not present. The workshop was organised by UNMAO’s technical advisor, with 
GICHD assisting with facilitation. The workshop brought together representatives from 
GoSS, the UN, NGO partners and other stakeholders. The aim of the workshop was to: 
 
• review the progress made since the 2010 T5 workshop 
• take stock of current levels of national ownership, compared to those identified 
in the T5 transition plan 
• identify key activities necessary to move to the next level of national ownership  
 







Review discussions during the T6 revealed that SSDA’s levels of national ownership, as 
agreed upon during the T5 workshop, far from accurately reflected the reality on the 
ground. One key reason for this discrepancy could be traced to the fact that the general 
level of capacity is considerably higher in the north compared to the south, explained in 
part by higher levels of education, more advanced infrastructure, and most importantly, 
considerably lower impacts of the war on all levels of society. The high levels of national 
ownership agreed on during the T5 could therefore have been a result of 
representatives from southern Sudan feeling intimidated in comparison with their 
northern counterparts. With new UNMAO staff members in the south, it was hard for 
them to accurately verify the levels indicated, since they were new to the context 
themselves. A number of individuals have highlighted these as plausible explanations as 
to why such exaggerated levels of national ownership were accepted.   
 
Recognising the shortcomings of the T5 workshop and of the subsequent plan, it was 
clearly emphasised from the very start that the T6 workshop should aim to result in 
agreed levels of well thought through national ownership, and accurately reflect the 
reality on the ground. Discussions during the T6 workshop made it clear that numerous 
aspects of the transition plan had not been fully understood by many of the SSDA staff 
members. Also, the lack of SMART56 indicators for the different levels of national 
ownership (level 0 “lowest” to level 4 “highest”) resulted in varying and highly 
subjective interpretations of the different levels.  
 
While most levels of national ownership corresponding to the different elements of the 
                                                    




transition plan were actually put back one or two levels, at least the T6 workshop 
resulted in a more realistic picture, reflecting the actual level of national ownership 
within the SSDA. Understandably however, the fact that many elements saw the levels 
of national ownership being brought back one, and sometimes even two steps, meant 
that many SSDA staff members were discouraged, since many felt they had made 
efforts and could see visible improvements in some areas. It was therefore important to 
point out that the “modification” of some levels should not be interpreted as a static 
situation at the SSDA, but rather as a result of a misleading starting point.  
 
CORE FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITES OF SSDA 
MRE and VA Department  
SSDA’s MRE/VA department is fairly small, with three staff members, including the 
director. Generally speaking, SSDA’s capacity to carry out its MRE responsibilities is very 
low. The T6 transition plan includes a total of eleven components. The T6 workshop 
determined that the level of national ownership corresponds to level 0 in two out of the 
eleven components, level 1 in seven out of the 11 components, level 2 in two cases.  
 
The SSDA has no capacity to task MRE activities or to conduct needs assessments and 
analysis to support the MRE programme. One of the key achievements of the MRE 
department appears to be that it organises the MRE working group on a monthly basis 
and has been hosting it at the SSDA premises since May 2010. UNMAO reported that, in 
collaboration with UNICEF, it developed a matrix stipulating MRE activities, and that this 
was used as a basis for the MRE work plan. It is unclear however, to what extent this 
activity matrix has been useful and implemented by the department.  
 
Key challenges that were pointed out referred to the generally low level of competency 
and skills of the staff members, as well as a lack of ability to communicate within the 
department and with key stakeholders in a professional manner. The extent to which 
on-the-job training activities have been carried out appears to be very low, with fairly 
limited interactions with UNICEF and UNMAO.  
 
The Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender, Child and Social Welfare (MoGCSW) is the 
Ministry responsible for disability issues in South Sudan, and VA falls under this broader 
responsibility. SSDA’s present role and responsibility in VA is mainly related to 
information sharing activities. Together with the MoGCSW, the SSDA co-chairs the 
monthly VA/disability working group meetings at the physical rehabilitation centre in 
Juba.  
 
Support Services Department  
The transition team focused its capacity development efforts in the support section on 




members have which positions, and their specific roles and responsibilities. The 
transition team clarified the organogram in 2010, and terms of reference (ToR) were 
developed for each of the eight departments, and for all the different staff positions.  
 
As of June 2011, the SSDA had a total of 96 staff members on its payroll. The T6 
workshop made it obvious that the roles and responsibilities of many SSDA staff 
members were unclear, and that, in too many cases there is confusion as to which 
departments and in particular, staff members are responsible for which activities. It 
therefore appears that the time and energy invested in developing and clarifying the 
roles and responsibilities among different departments and staff members have 
resulted in very limited, or no, visible improvements on the ground.  
 
Capacity assessment questionnaires were also developed by the transition team in 
2010-2011, with the aim of establishing the level of capacity of the different staff 
members and to clarify where the capacity gaps were the greatest.  
 
With the objective of strengthening the administrative and financial procedures within 
the SSDA, a total of 52 forms were developed in collaboration with the SSDA director of 
administration and finance. As a direct response to very poor attendance levels of SSDA 
staff members, a monthly attendance sheet was one of the many human resources (HR) 
forms that were developed, in the hope that this form should serve as a basis for the 
issuing of salaries. The extent to which this form has been implemented however, 
seems to be fairly limited.  On-the-job training on how to complete these forms was 
provided to relevant staff members in the Juba office and in the sub-regional offices of 
Yei, Wau and Malakal.  
 
There appears to have been very little collaboration between UNMAO and SSDA in 
relation to resource mobilisation activities. The SSDA programme director, who in 
theory should be responsible for fundraising activities at the SSDA, informed she has not 
collaborated at all with UNMAO’s programme officer who is involved in resource 
mobilisation. The resource mobilisation capabilities within the SSDA appear to be at 
best, very low and at worst, nonexistent.  
 
Information Management Department 
Component 6.1 of the transition plan relates to information management, and describes 
it as: “effective data entry and verification, collation, management and secure storage of 
mine action data”. As in the north, IMSMA is the system that is used to enter, manage 
and store mine action data in South Sudan. The transition plan stipulates the end state 
for component 6.1 as: “Using IMSMA, mine action data is managed and used in an 
efficient and effective manner”.  
 




of national ownership in information management should be brought back from level 2; 
“SSDA is managing and using mine action data, yet not done in an efficient or effective 
manner, and further improvements need to be made”, to level 1; “SSDA’s capacity to 
manage and use mine action data is being developed”.  
 
The rationale for setting the level of national ownership to correspond to level 2 in May 
2010 is hard to understand, as level 2 depends on a parallel IMSMA being up and 
running. SSDA has all necessary hardware for utilising IMSMA effectively, but a lack of 
regular supply of electricity has meant that as of September 2011, no parallel IMSMA 
was established at the SSDA. As of October 2011, the United Nations Mine Action 
Coordination Centre (UNMACC) was therefore still fully responsible for managing all 
mine action data in southern Sudan, with most external stakeholders going directly to 
UNMACC for information and/or maps.  
 
As in the operations department, NPA has been a key partner in the capacity 
development work of the information management department, providing IT and 
IMSMA courses and ongoing on-the-job training. NPA’s regional information 
management advisor is based in the NPA office located in the SSDA compound. When 
NPA started its capacity development project in mid-2010, a hardware/resources needs 
assessment of SSDA’s IMSMA department was carried out. As a response to the 
findings, NPA assisted in purchasing necessary equipment. A needs assessment looking 
into competencies and skills was carried out on an ad hoc basis. NPA informed that its 
activities have mainly responded to UNMAO’s capacity development suggestions. NPA 
started its information management training activities more or less “from scratch”, 
focusing on basic computer literacy, and familiarised the staff members with the most 
commonly used IMSMA forms, such as survey and completion forms, and the 
corresponding process of how to complete them. NPA and UNMAO’s IMSMA 
department have been collaborating in their capacity development efforts, planning and 
making decisions together.  
 
The main weaknesses of SSDA’s IMSMA department were highlighted to include lack of 
practical experience in using IMSMA and analysing data. Main strengths highlighted by 
NPA include the willingness and eagerness to learn and a high level of commitment. 
Until a parallel IMSMA has been installed at the SSDA, NPA will focus its capacity 
development activities on training the IMSMA staff members in quality assurance and 
data entry, using a “dummy IMSMA”. The aim is to familiarise the staff members with 
the process of report entry and quality assurance, as a preparation for the “real” 
IMSMA.  
 
In terms of the level of capacity in the various areas of information management, it has 
been pointed out that data entry is the area where the SSDA is the most advanced, 
whereas there is still need for training in reporting, mainly due to lack of opportunities 




touched upon. One of the main problems appears to be the lack of practical 
opportunities to actually use IMSMA, apart from data entry activities at UNMAO. As 
argued by NPA: “The guys have had no opportunity to show anyone how good they 
are”.  
 
Operations Department  
The capacity level of SSDA’s operations department is weak in many areas. As of mid-
2011, UNMAO was taking the lead in all major elements of operations, including 
accreditation, tasking, quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC). A number of 
cases illustrate a keen interest and a high level of motivation among some SSDA QA 
officers in learning new skills and taking on more responsibilities. However, SSDA’s 
operations department’s ability to effectively, efficiently and professionally manage all 
the operational aspects of the mine action programme remains very limited. The 
weakest area in SSDA’s operations department is in tasking operators through the 
issuing of clear, concise and accurate task dossiers.  
 
As of June 2011, SSDA had no capacity to task and manage mine action activities. The T6 
transition plan stipulates that this capacity would be developed throughout 2011 and 
2012, mainly through an increased involvement of relevant SSDA staff members in 
tasking procedures. The transition plan further sets out that SSDA’s operations 
department should be trained in task dossier development. The plan also stipulates that 
“SSDA will create and manage tasks by at least 50 per cent by September 2012”. 
Whether this is a realistic goal remains to be seen.  
 
As to the quality management of operations activities, a QA system has been developed 
and introduced by the UNMAO, and SSDA QA officers collaborate with UNMAO to 
conduct QA activities. There are examples of excellent collaboration between SSDA QA 
officers and UNMAO operational staff, both in Juba and in Yei. The success of these 
collaborations appears to be rooted in motivated individuals, largely dependent on high 
levels of commitment and interest from both sides, resulting in effective on-the-job 
training. It is clear that these success stories reflect high levels of individual 
commitment, motivation and interest, rather than a high level of institutional capacity.  
 
Key actors have recognised that that an in-depth knowledge of mine action is a 
necessary precondition for the SSDA to effectively carry out accreditation and quality 
management activities in compliance with the NTSGs. The T6 stipulates that this will be 
achieved through an integrated field-based training programme, along with on-the-job 
placements with UNMAO and implementing partners. The key areas this on-the-job 
training focuses on include: 
  
• general mine action assessment 





• manual clearance 
• mechanical clearance 
• MDD 
• EOD 
• clearance survey and post-completion survey 
 
Joint reconnaissance activities with the aim of supporting the development of an 
implementation plan that fully responds to task dossiers is currently underway, and will 
continue with the goal of SSDA, leading joint reconnaissance exercises with technical 
assistance of the transition team by June 2012.  
 
Upon the request from the UNMAO technical advisor and chief of operations, the 
commercial company Mine Tech International (MTI) offered four weeks’ “integrated 
mine action” training to five SSDA QA officers in March 2011. The course covered the 
following areas:  
 
• overview – MRE 
• field visits – integrated mine clearance 
• planning 
• asset deployment 
• threat assessment 
 
According to MTI, the SSDA staff members’ performance during the course was very 
mixed, with a varying degree of commitment. Three out of the five participants passed 
the course. The fact that this training came out of a request from UNMAO suggests 
there is good collaboration between different actors in southern Sudan, indicating that 
there is a commitment to collaborate in developing the capacity of the SSDA.  
    
Commercial company G4S has also been involved in on-the-job training, through field 
placement of SSDA QA officers in G4S operations for an extended period of time.  
Residual Capacity  
As of mid-2011, there was no concrete plan in place for how to deal with residual 
contamination, specifying what capacities would be necessary and who would be 
responsible. Recognising that new minefields are still being discovered, and that new 
landmines are being laid in a number of volatile states including Unity and Upper Nile, it 
is understandable that the focus is still on how to deal with the known contamination in 
the most effective and efficient manner.  
 
Respondents from both SSDA and UNMNAO have highlighted that the most effective 
and logical ways of dealing with a future residual threat would be through police and/or 




in relation to plans for SPLA to deal with residual contamination. It was highlighted that 
one option could be to have an international commercial company training the SPLA.   
 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS INVOLVED IN THE CAPACITY 
DEVELOPMENT PROCESS IN SOUTHERN SUDAN 
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) 
NPA started its operations in southern Sudan in 1986, with a focus on food security, 
health care, development of local communities, as well as training programmes for the 
local population. NPA established its mine action programme in Yei, South Sudan in 
March 2004, carrying out clearance and survey activities.57  
 
NPA is the NGO that has been most heavily involved in capacity development activities 
with the SSDA in southern Sudan, and it also has a long history of close support to the 
SPLM. NPA started its capacity development project with SSDA in mid-2010, after being 
approached by UNDP’s technical advisor at the time. UNMAS played an important role 
in helping NPA secure Canadian funding for the capacity development project, with 
senior UNMAS staff liaising with the Canadian donor, emphasising the need for 
additional capacity development efforts.  
 
This example illustrates the good collaboration between key actors in the capacity 
development process in South Sudan. UNDP requested NPA to assist in training SSDA 
QA and operations officers, training IM staff and implementing the IMSMA, IT support, 
and providing advice to the SSDA management staff members on a daily basis. NPA MA 
and UNDP signed a memorandum of understanding, and two NPA staff members 
started working in the capacity development project in 2010, setting up a container in 
the SSDA compound, in order to encourage a close working relationship with SSDA staff 
members. NPA initially started with one expatriate capacity development advisor, one 
expatriate IM staff member, and three national staff members. In collaboration with 
UNMAO, NPA was mandated to implement the following training activities for relevant 
SSDA staff members: 
 
• manual demining training course, including explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) 
training course level 1 
• EOD training courses level two and three 
• relevant quality assurance and operations courses 
• “on–the-job” training during quality assurance visits with UNMAO 
• IT and IMSMA training to SSDA IM staff members 
 
NPA’s second phase of capacity development activities with the SSDA runs from 2011 to 
2013, with the long term objective that SSDA has a functional and sustainable mine 
                                                    




action authority/mine action centre that coordinates all mine action activities and 
stakeholders in South Sudan. From 2011, NPA has coordinated all capacity development 
activities closely with UNMAO and the transition team, with the aim of “corresponding 
directly to crucial institutional functions of the national mine action authority as 
identified in the Transition Plan and as part of the collaborative efforts of the Transition 
Team”.58 During the second phase, NPA is focusing its activities in the following areas: 
 
• institutional capacity building: NPA to provide logistics, finance and 
administration courses in accordance with IMAS and requirements from GoSS 
and UNDP in implementing Element 9 of the transition plan   
• quality assurance and operations management: NPA to provide on-the-job 
training and field attachments in accordance with IMAS and NTSGs, in close 
collaboration with UNMAO, commercial mine action companies and mine action 
NGOs  
• IM and IMSMA: NPA to provide information management training to all SSDA 
field offices  
• NPA to incorporate gender, sexual exploitation and anti-corruption in its training 
activities. Training to be conducted by a national partner organisation  
• land release: NPA, in collaboration with the GICHD, to provide a selected 
number of SSDA staff members with knowledge on how land release 
methodology can be implemented in South Sudan  
Mines Advisory Group 
MAG has been operational in southern Sudan since 2004. While MAG has not been 
involved in direct capacity development/transition activities with the SSDA, the 
organisation has supported its national partner organisation Operation Save Innocent 
Lives (OSIL) since 1998, with the aim of strengthening the national mine action capacity.   
 
Since 2009, MAG has, in collaboration with CHF, implemented a 3-year project that aims 
to develop the capacity of OSIL. The project aims to develop OSIL’s capacity at three 
different levels – mine action, livelihoods and organisational development. OSIL has 
been involved in mine action since it started operating in South Sudan, and has, over 
the last few years had an operational focus on MRE/CL activities. MAG’s capacity 
development activities in this project included the following activities: 
 
• expand OSIL’s level of capacity in CL activities, through training and “handing 
over” a fully trained national community liaison manager (NCLM) and CL team 
• develop OSIL’s technical expertise through training and “handing over” a fully 
trained national technical field manager (NTFM), a manual demining team and a 
mechanical team 
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Since March 2010, MAG also implemented a second project, focusing exclusively on 
capacity development.   
 
MAG organised a level 3 EOD course in Juba in July 2010. A total of 38 participants 
attended the course, with 18 participants successfully completing it. One of the key 
objectives was for the course to directly contribute towards building the country’s 
national capacity to coordinate, implement and monitor mine action activities.  
Danish Demining Group  
The Danish Deminign Group (DDG) started its activities in southern Sudan shortly after 
the signing of the CPA in 2005, and has since the beginning focused on MRE, low-tech 
EOD, BAC and stockpile destruction. In line with DDG’s global development, a new 
programme focusing on armed violence reduction (AVR) activities started in 2009. Since 
the second half of 2011, the organisation has intensified the community focus of its 
mine action activities, using a “village-by-village approach”, thereby increasing the 
number of community based tasking and prioritisation.  
 
As with MAG, DDG has not been directly involved in developing the capacity of the 
SSDA. However, the organisation organised a level 3 EOD course jointly with NPA in 
early 2011. Around 20 southern Sudanese representatives from southern Sudanese 
NGOs, SSDA and UNMAO participated in the course. All four SSDA representatives who 
participated passed.  
 
In mid-2010, DDG’s donors started demanding a more explicit capacity building 
component in DDG’s activities. As a response to this, DDG looked into possibilities of 
initiating capacity development activities with SSDA, and was more or less told by 
UNMAO and NPA that “they had that covered”.   
 
Rather than starting capacity development activities directly with SSDA, DDG reached 
out to the national NGO Operation Landmine Action and Victim Assistance (OLAVS), and 
initiated a capacity development collaboration.  
 
OLAVS is a renewed organisation of the Sudan Landmine Response (SLR), a national 
organisation that used to work closely with Halo Trust, until allegations of corruption led 
to the break-up of the partnership. Key activities include the training of one EOD and 
one MRE team (mainly through on-the-job training).  
 
At the time of writing, the MRE team was accredited, and the EOD team was awaiting 
accreditation. DDG believes that these activities have been quite successful, judging by 
the accreditation of the MRE team. What has been more challenging however, has been 
the attempt to develop the OLAV’s institutional capacity. The main reasons for this were 






Swiss Foundation for Mine Action  
As highlighted previously, the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) was one of the 
first operators involved in the surveying and clearance of roads in southern Sudan, 
contracted by the World Food Programme (WFP). FSD entered into a partnership 
agreement with national organisation Sudan Integrated Mine Action (SIMAS) already in 
2004. Funding was secured in 2006, to enable capacity development activities of SIMAS.  
 
FSD ceased its operational activities in late 2007, and focused exclusively on providing 
technical advice and capacity development assistance to SIMAS, through the presence 
of international advisors, in programming and finance. This lead to strengthened 
capacity in operational areas, resulting in UNMAO accreditation of a SIMAS clearance 
team in 2007, after which SIMAS carried out clearance operations independently. As of 
mid-2011, SIMAS had one mine clearance team, one EOD team and two MRE teams. 
Following the independence of South Sudan in July 2011, SIMAS changed its name to 
South Sudan Integrated Mine Action Service.  
 
The GICHD 
The GICHD organised a workshop on international humanitarian law for SSDA in Juba in 
April 2011. The workshop was convened to address the content of the APMBC, the CCM 
and the CCW. Some 15 SSDA staff members participated in the workshop, including the 
director and deputy director, the operations manager and the legal advisor. 
 
In late 2010, the GICHD was requested by the SSDA, UNMAO and NPA to provide land 
release training, which it carried out in April 2011. The training was conducted in 
cooperation with UNMAO and NPA, who also provided instructors for the training. The 
four-day training covered the key areas of the land release process, and was attended 
by about 15 SSDA staff members from various departments. The GICHD’s information 
management section has provided continuous IMSMA support to the SSDA.  
 
GICHD also assisted with the facilitation of the three-day sixth transition workshop, held 
in Juba in June 2011.  
 
POST-INDEPENDENCE: WAY AHEAD 
The 2011 South Sudan Development Plan (SSDP) is an outcome of the collaboration 
between a number of actors. The key aim of the plan is to guide government and donor 
spending in South Sudan.  
 
The SSDA, with assistance from UNMAO and UNDP technical advisors, was part of the 
security working group in the drafting of the plan. A total of 17 institutions were 




out that the SSDA representatives were among the top three in terms of quality of 
input, reliability and participation. The SSDP drafting process provided the SSDA with a 
good opportunity to strengthen the visibility of mine action, and to clarify mine action’s 
importance in South Sudan’s development. Mine action falls under the conflict 
prevention and security pillar, which sets out to “free the country from the impact of 
landmines and ERW”. The document indicates that national authorities will “conduct 
and coordinate mine action activities to support the safety of the citizens and the socio-
economic development of the country”. Planned outcomes include: 
 
• the release of 1,306 hazardous areas for resettlement, agriculture, grazing and 
road construction 
• the reduction of mine action accidents through mine risk education activities 
• the provision of physical rehabilitation services, psychological support and socio-
economic reintegration of mine victims 
 
The SSDP articulates sectoral capacity development requirements, and is accompanied 
by a Medium-Term Capacity Development Strategy59 which sets out to provide a 
strategic framework for organising capacity development efforts in support of GoSS’ 
state building objectives.  
 
The UNSCR 1996 of 8 July 2011 defines the mandate of the UN in supporting the 
republic of South Sudan in mine action activities, and in building the capacities of the 
SSDA. The resolution authorises the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) to 
perform the following tasks; “Supporting the Government of the Republic of South 
Sudan in conducting demining activities within available resources and strengthening 
the capacity of the republic of South Sudan Demining Authority to conduct mine action 




. This new mandate resulted 
in the mine action office changing its name from UNMAO to the UN Mine Action 
Coordination Centre (UNMACC) on 1 September 2011.  
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SUDAN’S CHALLENGING CONTEXT AND THE MULTIPLE RESPONSIBILITIES 
OF UNMAO 
 
The Sudan MAP has been praised for its impressive clearance outputs and for enabling 
the transportation of humanitarian assistance on verified, safe roads rather than by air, 
saving millions of dollars. The opening of key routes also facilitated the safe 
resettlement of IDP and refugee returnees. A 2008 evaluation of EC – funded mine 
action programmes in Africa concluded that, 
 
“… in spite of the vastness of the country, the decrepit infrastructure, and the modest 
level of knowledge concerning the scope and nature of the explosives contamination, UN 
MA Service (UN and its partners) have done an excellent job in establishing mine action 
operations and coordinating these through UNMAO”. 
61 
 
The MAP has also been recognised for its significant contributions to peace building, 
particularly in the early days. It is generally recognized that the Sudan MAP has had to 
operate in a challenging, highly political context, in combination with having to deal 
with poor infrastructure with limited access to many areas due to volatile security 
situations, flooding, no roads or a combination of all.  Many UNMAO staff have pointed 
out that the focus has been on “getting the job done”, essentially meaning carrying out 
as much clearance as possible, in support of the UNMIS, as well as carrying out the 
responsibility of coordinating all operators.  
 
A 2007 external evaluation of the Sudan mine action programme concluded that the 
biggest weakness in the programme was capacity development. Likewise, 2010 multi-
donor evaluation62 of support to conflict prevention and peace building activities in 
Southern Sudan underlined the following: 
 
“Where criticism seems warranted, it is in the role of UNMAO in developing a 
transitional strategy to hand over mandate and responsibilities to the Southern Sudan 
Demining Commission and national authorities after 2011. …overall management of the 
sector by UNMAO has been generally highly regarded. But efforts to coordinate with 
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GoSS and the SSDC as well as the other commissions were less successful and have not 




It is clear that capacity development, despite being included in all key documents that 
make up the normative framework for the capacity development/transition process of 
the Sudan mine action programme, was not viewed as a priority when focusing on 
“getting the job done”. The Sudan MAP was faced with considerable pressure to open 
key routes allowing humanitarian aid to be transported by road rather by air. In this 
context, priority was not put on developing the capacity of the national counterparts. In 
addition, capacity development responsibilities were not included in any of the UNMAO 
staff’s ToR in the first few years. Even in June 2011, most UNMAO staff had no capacity 
development provisions in their ToR. Consequently, the lack of clearly defined roles and 
responsibilities for capacity development activities resulted in few personnel 
“volunteering” to make the extra effort to involve relevant personnel of the NMAC and 
the SSDA in their work. One evaluation of UNDP’s capacity development project has 
also highlighted doubts as to whether UNMAS personnel have the necessary skills and 
aptitudes to train and mentor national counterparts.64 With pressure from the UNMIS 
and a busy schedule accrediting, tasking, coordinating and quality assuring operators, 
capacity development activities were sidelined from the beginning of the programme. 
Some respondents have pointed out that they believe a stronger focus on capacity 
development would have “slowed down productivity”.  
 
Recommendation: If UNMAS personnel are expected to be involved in capacity 
development activities, this needs to be taken into consideration during the recruitment 
and selection processes to ensure the selected personnel have relevant skills. Capacity 
development roles and responsibilities should be explicitly defined in relevant ToR and 
job descriptions and staff should be required to report on these activities. This would 
help clarify who is responsible for what and it would avoid the risk of capacity 
development being marginalised as an objective and viewed as an area that is not 
included in “getting the job done”. This way, capacity development would not be an 
option that can be ignored, but a requirement, just like any other responsibility.  
 
COMPETITION AMONG UN AGENCIES 
A number of individuals – national as well as international, in both northern and 
southern Sudan – highlighted problems related to “UN internal fighting” –. Many SSDA 
personnel seemed puzzled by the bad relationship between UNMAS and UNDP, and 
were surprised at the visible tensions and open confrontations among some personnel. 
In particular, people highlighted tensions between a previous UNMAS programme 
manager and a UNDP CTA as a problem. Some pointed out that these clashes were 
mainly “personality driven,” whereas others suspect that they were “trickle down 
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effects” of tensions between UNDP and UNMAS at HQ level. 
 
That broader tensions existed in the recent past between UNDP and UNMAS HQ is no 
secret, and many UN staff in Sudan believe these affected the relationship between 
these agencies at field level. One respondent pointed out that a key aspect of UNDP’s 
and UNICEF’s way of working was that they “put the government in the front and took a 
step back.” The same respondent also pointed out that in the UNMAO set-up, however, 
the UNMAS dominance meant that the UN took a leading role and the government took 
a step back. In their view, this was “contradicting the CPA,” which clearly sets out that 
the UN should be supporting the government. It is worth noting, however, that a 
number of individuals reported that the relationship between UNMAS and UNDP at HQ 
level has improved dramatically since mid-2011, something many put down to changes 
in senior staff.  
 
It is apparent that UN internal conflicts made collaboration within UNMAO difficult; 
something pointed out by representatives from SSDA, NMAC, UN agencies and national 
and international NGOs. UNICEF and UNDP personnel stated that they felt sidelined and 
undermined by the many UNMAS personnel, arguing that the dominance of UNMAS 
personnel within the UNMAO instilled a military-like culture in the organisation. This, at 
times, prevented UNMAO from establishing good working relationships with the 
national mine action authorities, civil society, development organisations, government 
ministries, and the broader humanitarian community.  
 
The fact that UNDP and UNICEF personnel refer to UNMAS as being UNMAO indicates 
to what extent UNMAS was perceived to dominate UNMAO. One senior UNMAS staff 
member described the UNDP – UNMAS relationship as “UNDP is from Venus and 
UNMAS is from Mars” – referring to UNMAS often being perceived as the more 
“martial, militant and harsher” UN agency, while UNDP is the “softer, more feminine” 
agency. It appears that UNDP and UNMAS often looked at the same issue but saw 
different things, coming up with different, often opposing strategies and plans for 
solving those issues. Some respondents pointed out that a “lack of division of labour” 
constituted one key source of conflict between UN agencies.  
 
Another issue relates to a lack of clarity in how the UN inter-agency policy assigns 
responsibilities to the various UN agencies. As mentioned earlier, this policy designates 
UNDP as the lead agency to support capacity development activities. Conversely, 
UNMAS is mandated to coordinate the planning of the transfer of programme 
management responsibilities to national authorities and, in cooperation with other UN 
mine action team agencies, to advise governments on the development of mine action 






It seems these policy statements have contributed to conflicts and confusion between 
the two agencies. UNDP as an institution has expertise in creating an enabling 
environment through the development of necessary legal, policy and regulatory 
frameworks, which are critical to enabling NMAAs to carry out their mandated 
functions. The role of UNMAS in providing complementary technical know-how and 
expertise at an operations level and through concrete on-the-job training is an equally 
essential component of the transition and capacity development package.  
 
Despite these issues, UNMAO successfully managed to develop a number of important 
planning documents such as the multi-year work plans and the transition plans. It is also 
important to note that, without the strong mandate of UNMAO through UNMIS and the 
UNSCR 1590, mine action would probably not have received the attention it did 
immediately after the CPA. Thanks to considerable funding from the assessed budget 
and other mechanisms, clearance operations were quickly organised and implemented.  
 
Recommendation: To ensure the UN agencies’ comparative advantages and areas of 
expertise complement each other in unambiguous ways, we recommend the UN inter-
agency policy be reviewed. In addition to the UN inter-agency policy, we recommend 
that, for any collaborations among UN agencies, the agencies involved agree upon a 
memorandum of understanding which clearly defines the roles and responsibilities of 
the different agencies in that specific context. Finally, we recommend that capacity 
development roles and responsibilities are included in the ToR for all relevant 
personnel, which will require agreement on these ToR by senior staff. The different 
roles and responsibilities should be complementary and clear to all stakeholders 
involved.  
HIGH UN SALARIES: CHALLENGES IN ABSORBING AND RETAINING 
COMPETENT STAFF  
While the issue of salary discrepancies between the UN and governmental agencies is 
not unique to the mine action sector, numerous respondents argued that the high 
salaries paid to Sudanese UNMAO personnel led to difficulties in absorbing them into 
the NMAC and the SSDA. Many highlighted that salary discrepancies represent a key 
obstacle for national authorities to recruiting the most qualified and competent 
individuals. Also mentioned was that some national personnel prefer working with UN 
agencies and international NGOs because of the greater professional opportunities that 
are perceived to exist with those agencies.  
 
Recommendation: A 2007 evaluation of the Sudan MAP also highlighted the issue of 
high UNMAO salaries as a key challenge in absorbing national staff working with 
UNMAO into the SSDA and NMAC.65 That report recommended that UNMAS and 
UNOPS consider this issue when first designing and starting up a new programme. It 
further advised UNMAS/UNOPS to consider having the government entity hire the 
                                                    




national staff directly, with the UN providing funds to increase the salaries of these 
individuals by entering into a contract with the NMAA. Apparently, this has been done 
in some countries to avoid the problem of absorbing national staff from UN agencies 
into the NMAA.  
 
STAFF RETENTION 
Many respondents stated that the high turnover of national and expatriate personnel 
represented a key challenge to capacity development. There are many examples of 
individuals benefiting from capacity development efforts only to leave shortly after 
training, resulting in a lack of continuity and missed opportunities for the national mine 
action authorities to reap the benefits from capacity development activities. This also 
points to the challenge of developing institutional capabilities rather than individual 
capacities, which is less sustainable. Many respondents highlighted how the sudden 
departure of one senior SSDA staff member affected the Authority, as her competency, 
knowledge and experience were greatly missed by fellow SSDA colleagues and external 
partners. This particular staff member moved to another government ministry so the 
GoSS continued benefiting from her competencies and skills, but it was a big loss for 
SSDA. As for NMAC, high staff turnover was to a large extent the result of some staff 
being secondees from the Ministry of Defence (MoD). Many of these had to leave 
NMAC on short notice due to internal MoD arrangements.  
 
DEDICATION, COMMITMENT AND INTENTION TO LEARN IS KEY FOR 
SUCCESSFUL TRANSITION 
At the risk of stating the obvious, a certain level of dedication, commitment and 
willingness to share and to learn is a necessary precondition for any capacity 
development effort. Without this, millions of USD can be spent with little progress 
sustained. Numerous examples highlight how high levels of commitment and 
motivation have resulted in strengthened capacity. Conversely, other examples 
illustrate how a lack of commitment and motivation has seriously hampered capacity 
development. The extent and rate of progress is essentially in the hands of Sudanese 
authorities – external agencies can only assist and support. 
 
TRANSPARENCY AND INFORMATION SHARING 
Transparency and information sharing are key aspects of capacity development. 
Examples of good information sharing and transparency illustrate strengthened trust, 
whereas a lack of these points to the opposite.  
 
SPECIFIC FINDINGS AND LESSONS LEARNT: NMAC 
 




Many respondents argued that a key problem with the transition/capacity development 
process was that it should have been given more resources and recognition at an earlier 
stage: “The UN should have been serious about transition earlier”. A number of NMAC 
staff pointed out that, prior to the T5 workshop, the relationship between NRMAO and 
NMAC used to be “quite bad”, with poor information sharing and a lack of transparency. 
Some NMAC staff also highlighted that they used to be under the impression that 
NRMAO “was not so keen in helping out and in developing the capacity”.  
 
T5 transition workshop/plan 
As previously mentioned, the T5 workshop and the subsequent transition report were 
highly regarded by many who worked with NMAC and UNMAO in June 2011. The 
workshop clarified the transition process and what needed to be done, and the resulting 
transition plan served as a basis for updating and refining the transition matrix, 
specifying activities, timelines, roles and responsibilities. They also pointed out that the 
workshop increased confidence within NMAC in how to plan and to reach specific goals. 
The workshop also strengthened the trust between NMAC and NRMAO, as NMAC staff 
felt that UNMAO was committed to helping them develop their capacities. Clearly, the 
T5 workshop and the transition plan were important in initiating a more concrete 
transition process. 
 
The transition matrix 
While the transition workshops and plans were important aspects of the capacity 
development and transition process, the development of the transition matrices were 
key in clarifying how to achieve the goals set out in transition plans. The matrices 
stipulated the activities that had to be carried out, which element of the transition plan 
each corresponded to, the status of the activity (planned, ongoing or completed), the 
individuals responsible, and the deadline for completion. Transition plans are of little 
concrete value without clearly defining such points. While transition plans have served 
as guiding documents, it was the matrices that stipulated how to achieve what, how, by 
whom and by when. The development of the matrices is therefore a key lesson learnt, 
and we recommend that transition plans should always be accompanied by concrete 
implementation plans.   
 
Collocation 
The collocation of NRMAO with NMAC in early 2011 strengthened capacity 
development/transition activities and represented a turning point in the process at 
NMAC. Many NRMAO and NMAC personnel stated it was the collocation that truly 
kicked off the capacity development process, making transition more “real.” Collocation 
signalled to NMAC that NRMAO “was serious about transition” and it was willing to 
assist. It is clear that collocation facilitated the following: 
o building trust between NMAC and NRMAO 
o coordination 
o collaboration 





o on-the-job training 
 
A number of challenges had to be overcome for collocation to happen. Willingness and 
commitment by UNMAO and NMAC directors were preconditions. Many respondents 
said the capacity of the NMAC would have been considerably higher had collocation 
taken place at an earlier stage. Senior NMAC and UNMAO personnel underlined that the 
delay of the collocation was a lesson learnt; it should have happened in 2010.  
 
Information sharing and transparency  
In terms of financial transparency, information sharing led to greater trust between the 
NMAC director and senior management in UNMAO. One senior UNMAS staff member 
underlined that taking the time to sit down with the NMAC director, go through the 
finances and the UNMAO budget, and explaining each budget line improved their 
relationship considerably. Enhancing trust is essential for any capacity development 
process. 
 
Adapt to national procedures, rather than transferring the “UN way” of doing 
things  
It appears there was a tendency to simply transfer the “UN way” of doing things to 
certain areas of responsibilities of the NMAC. While there are international standards 
which need to be followed for, say, the technical areas of accreditation and quality 
assurance, many of NMAC’s responsibilities need to comply with the “government way” 
of doing things.  For example, one area highlighted as particularly relevant was that of 
procurement. NMAC’s procurement is managed through the Ministry of Humanitarian 
Affairs, and a number of respondents pointed out that the focus on “UN ways of doing” 
procurement would not result in a sustainable structure since UN procedures are often 
incompatible with the GoS’ procedures. The failure to adapt to the government 
procedures that guide many areas of NMAC’s activities resulted in challenges for the 
GoS in assuming ownership of the MAP. One respondent also pointed out that the 
transition plan was made by assessing the situation through “UN lenses” and failed to 
recognise how the NMAC operates.  
 
SPECIFIC FINDINGS AND LESSONS LEARNT: SSDA 
 
Commitment and motivation are key 
Many respondents viewed the main challenge to capacity development as the lack of 
commitment and motivation among some SSDA personnel. Basic work ethics such as 
attendance, showing-up for arranged meetings and completing assigned tasks were 
highlighted as issues that hamper any meaningful capacity development activities. 
Many have indicated particular problems at the middle-management level. There is a 
widespread belief that some of the main donors are losing confidence in the SSDA and 




and political buy-in are preconditions for success in capacity development. The extent 
and rate of progress is essentially in the hands of South Sudanese authorities; NPA, UN 
agencies, GICHD, etc. can only support.  
 
Many respondents stated that some senior UNMAO personnel displayed no 
commitment to capacity development. In fact, some (both from the UNMAS and from 
SSDA) argued that capacity development was “actively discouraged” by UNMAO 
management for a number of years, resulting in tension between SSDA and UNMAO. 
Most respondents highlighted that the mid-2010 change of UNMAO management, 
which was a conscious decision from UNMAS HQ, resulted in dramatic improvements in 
relations between SSDA and UNMAO, with a strengthened focus on capacity 
development.  
  
Recommendation: A rigorous performance based system needs to be formally 
established, with regular (at least annual) assessments of all personnel. This would 
contribute to improved organisational performance. All ToR and job descriptions should 
be reviewed to ensure these accurately reflect the requirements and responsibilities of 
the organisation. A code of conduct should be created and circulated to all personnel. 
For these measures to be effective, there needs to be buy in and support from SSDA’s 
senior management.  
 
The influence of nepotism, tribalism and political appointments on the 
effectiveness and professionalism of SSDA 
Many stated that nepotism and tribalism reduce the effectiveness of the SSDA. There is 
a widespread view that several SSDA personnel have been appointed because of family 
and tribal ties or for connections within the SPLA, and not because they have the 
necessary skills and experience. Another issue is the SSDA’s political appointees, as 
there is a risk of politicisation of SSDA’s activities. This obviously has consequences on 
any capacity development activities as the “right people” are not necessarily in the 
“right positions”. It appears that SSDA’s ability to select employees based on merit is 
limited.  
 
Recommendation: Recruitment procedures need to be made more transparent and 
rigorous to ensure that individuals are recruited based on their competencies, 
experience and skills. It is important that SSDA has a combination of sector-specific skills 
and expertise as well as core functional skills such as basic public financial management.  
 
No separation between the Authority and the mine action centre  
One challenge for the SSDA is that there is no clear separation between the Authority 
and the MAC. As highlighted previously, the SSDA is responsible both for broad policy 
decisions and for overseeing mine action on a day-to-day basis at the operational level. 
Many respondents argued that multiple problems stem from the lack of separation 
between the Authority and the MAC, including confusion related to the SSDA mandate 




separation between the Authority and the MAC. NPA has shared concrete suggestions 
to the SSDA, clearly illustrating how the two areas can be separated in a straight-
forward manner. 
 
As well, the importance of separating the authority and the MAC was highlighted in two 
other evaluations.66 IMAS 02.1067 presents clear advice on how this can be achieved.  
 
Recommendation: To clarify SSDA’s mandate, we recommend that the operational 
and authority levels be separated.  
 
Transition plan 
It is clear that the experience from the T5 workshop and the subsequent preparation of 
the transition plan in southern Sudan was in sharp contrast to that of northern Sudan. A 
key problem was that the pre-T6 transition plans were unrealistic, portraying levels of 
national ownership that did not reflect the reality. Most respondents said the transition 
plan was not a useful document. Other key flaws included: 
 
o no concrete, SMART action points  
o no indicators of the different degrees of national ownership of the transition 
plan  
 
Many stated the delay in drafting and distributing of the transition as another problem. 
This led some SSDA personnel to disassociate themselves from what previously had 
been agreed, with momentum lost. In combination with the above problems, the lack of 
a realistic work plan and matrix accompanying it meant there has been little practical 
implementation of the transition plan. Subsequently, the June 2011 T6 workshop was 
significant because frank and honest discussions took place about the actual degrees of 
national ownership, leading to a more realistic transition plan. In addition, the T6 
transition plan was distributed within a few days of the T6 workshop. 
 
Recommendation: To avoid key stakeholders “disassociating” themselves from 
transition plans, and to make the most of the momentum from workshops, we 
recommend that future transition plans are drafted and distributed as soon after the 
workshops as possible.  
 
A concrete capacity development work plan and a “matrix of transitional activities”, 
similar to that developed at NMAC, are necessary complements to the transition plan. 
These clarify the capacity development/transition roles and responsibilities, activities, 
responsible person(s) and deadlines.  
 
Collocation  
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Despite talk of collocation, no UNMAS personnel were permanently located with the 
SSDA as of late 2011. The NMAC example clearly demonstrates that collocation can 
have positive results, speeding the capacity development process considerably. 
Challenges related to collocation do exist; a lack of a regular supply of electricity was 
highlighted as one. However, commitment from senior managers on both sides of the 
partnership would result in dealing with challenges in a proactive and pragmatic manner.  
 
Recommendation: We recommend that UNMACC learn from the positive experience 
at NMAC. While recognising that northern Sudan provided a very different context to 




While some on-the-job training has taken place, particularly with SSDA quality 
assurance and IMSMA officers, where close working relationships between UNMACC 
and SSDA have been established, it is clear that much more could have been done.  
 
Recommendation: On-the-job training needs to be included in a work plan and 
stipulated in relevant UNMACC staff ToRs.  
 
Collaboration between the UN and NPA 
As stated above, NPA has been a key actor in the capacity development efforts ever 
since UNDP requested its assistance in 2010. The collaboration between NPA and 
UNMAO has been excellent, with UNMAO playing an instrumental role in securing 
donor funding for NPA’s capacity development project.  
 
This provides a positive example of good team spirit between different actors who 
recognise each other's advantages and strengths, with UN agencies proactively 
engaging with NGOs. This particular collaboration represents a best-practice, and we 
recommend that it be continued, and where appropriate, replicated in other countries. 
 
Organisational capacity development  
Despite efforts from various organisations involved in capacity development, it appears 
that SSDA’s capacity has seen very limited improvements. Although an organigram, job 
descriptions and set of ToRs have been developed, along with a number of process 
documents, SSDA’s organisational structures remain weak. Many SSDA personnel have 
attended middle and senior management courses in Jordan and the U.S. over the years, 
but it is difficult to detect the benefit of these courses on SSDA.  
 
Recommendation: Organisational structures, systems, processes and resources 
required for the implementation of SSDA’s mandate, function and the delivery of 
services need to be strengthened considerably for SSDA to assume its responsibilities. 




clarified to ensure SSDA’s performance is not dependent on individuals, but on solid 
standard operating procedures.  
 
Ensure a Holistic and Strategic Approach to Capacity Development 
As the world’s newest country, South Sudan now receives considerable state building 
support from a range of international actors. The SSDP is an important document, 
presenting South Sudan’s development priorities through 2013. The SSDA and UNMAO 
did an excellent job in ensuring the inclusion of mine action within the plan’s security 
pillar. Capacity development has been made a national development priority under the 
responsibility of the GoSS, and the medium-term capacity development strategy serves 
as a guiding document in this regard.  
 
Recommendation: Ensure that the development of South Sudan’s Mine Action 
Authority’s capacity is integrated with the national capacity development process and 
aligned with national development priorities and policies. We recommend that SSDA’s 
capacity development partners use the momentum of the development of the SSDP and 
work with other national and international stakeholders to ensure their efforts are 
informed by an ongoing dialogue. While there are specific skill-sets and expertise that 
are unique to mine action, mine action capacity development partners can benefit 
greatly from the capacity development expertise that is available in other sectors. This 
would facilitate collaboration and information sharing among partners, while ensuring 
that capacity development efforts are driven as a national process, aligned with national 
priorities, processes and plans. Also, as highlighted in the medium-term capacity 
development strategy, partners need to be attentive to the absorptive capacity of 
national institutions to apply complex capacity development programmes that 
represent “international best practice.” Therefore we recommend realism, with a focus 
on what is needed and manageable from the perspective of South Sudan’s mine action 
authority. 
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ANNEX 1  
INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED 
Name Title Organisation 
Jurkuch Barach Jurkuch Chairperson SSDA 
Abe Enosa Director General SSDA 
Mike Rashid Fulla IMSMA Officer SSDA 
Deng Mabeny Kuot Chief IMSMA Officer SSDA 
Teddy Sheila Akello Programme Director SSDA 
Victor Yuggu Young Regional Quality Assurance Officer SSDA 
Tim Horner Deputy Director UNMAO 
Steve Pritchard Capayity Development Technical Advisor UNMAO 
Netsaneth IMSMA Officer UNMAO 
Geoffrey Downes Regional Quality Assurance Officer UNMAO 
Jonas Chaudhary Logistics Coordinaor UNMAO 
Massimiliano Pedretti Programme Manager EC 
Ralph Hasall Ex-Technical Advisor UNDP 
Nigel Clarke Programme Director DDG 
Ikram Shehu Regional IM Advvisor NPA 
Simon Lovell Operations Manager MTI 
Roger Gagen Programme Manager MTI 
Damien Walker Project Manager G4S 
Juliette Grundy SSR Officer UNMIS 
Lise Grande 
Deputy Resident and Humanitarian 
Coordinator UN 
Nigel Forrestal  Former Director UNMAO 
Qadeem Tariq Former CHIEF Technical Advisor UNDP 
Benedict Truniger Deputy Director FSD 
Jonas Anuar Director SIMAS 
Michelle Healy Programme Officer MAG 
Khalid Abdeen Elshami Director NMAC 
Sulafa Alrazik M. Osman Programme Officer NMAC 
Fathelrahman Mohammed Head of MRE Department NMAC 
Elhassan Ali IMSMA Officer NMAC 
Siral Kutim Abdalrhman Logistics Officer NMAC 
Nuha Awad  VA Associate NMAC 
Mohammed Eltaieb Ahmed Operations Officer NMAC 
Abdelazim Elshiekh Fagir Training officer & programme assistant  NMAC 




Leonie Barnes Programme Manager UNMAO 
Armen Harutyunyan Regional Operations Coordinator UNMAO 
Adina Dinca Northern Region Programme Officer UNMAO 
Boutros Hobeika MRE/VA Regional Officer UNMAO  
Mustafa bawar Regional IMSMA Officer UNMAO 
Andrew Roseveare Consultant  UNMAO 
Lou Luff Ex-Chief of Operations UNMAO 
Chris Clark Ex-Programme Manager UNMAS 
Insaf Nizam Child Protection Specialist (MA) UNICEF 
Kelly McAulay Country Programme Manager MAG 
Dr. Hussein Elobeid General Manager JASMAR 






ANNEX 2  
TIME-LINE: SUDAN MINE ACTION PROGRAMME  
Year Event  
2001 SPLA/M signed Geneva Call’s Deed of Commitment for Adherence to a Total Ban of Anti-Personnel Mines 
and for Cooperation in Mine Action 
2002 Nuba Mountains Ceasefire Agreement signed 
2002 Emergency Mine Action Programme established by UNMAS 
2003 Establishment of a national mine action office in Khartoum and the new Sudan Mine Action Directorate 
in Nairobi 
2003 Sudan signed and ratified the APMBC 
2004 APMBC entered into force on 1 April 
2004 First versions of the Sudan National Mine Action Strategic Framework and the Sudan National Mine 
Action Policy Framework were signed 
2004 Signature of the Declaration in Nairobi 
2004 United Nations Advanced Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS) established 
2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed 
2005 UNMIS established by UNSCR 1590 
2005 Sudan’s NMAA established by Presidential Decree No. 299 
2006 Regional mine action centre (RMAC) changed name to Southern Sudan Demining Authority (SSDA) by 
Presidential Decree No. 45 
2006 National Mine Action Strategic Framework updated and endorsed by Presidential Decree No. 283 
2007  Sudan signed the CRPD 
2008  First transition workshop organised in Nairobi in February, as per the 2006 Strategic Framework 
2008 Second transition workshop held in Nairobi in May 
2008 Third transition workshop held in Khartoum in August 
2008 Fourth transition meeting held in Juba in November 
2009 Starting point for implementation of transition plan in January 
2009 Sudan ratified the CRPD 
2010 Fifth transition workshop (T5) held in Khartoum in May 
2010 “Transition team” (UNDP, UNMAS and NPA) created in southern Sudan 
2010 T5 Transition Plan distributed in February 
2010 Sudan adopted the Sudan Mine Action Law in March, by Presidential Decree No. 51 
2011 Referendum on unity of Sudan or secession of South Sudan in 7 February, As per clause 2.533 of the CPA 
2011 T5 transition workshop held in Juba 
2011 South Sudan became independent on 9 July 
2011 UNMIS and UNMAO’s mandate expired 
2011 UNSCR 1996 mandated the establishment of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and the UN Mine 
Action Coordination Center,  as from 1 September,  











SUMMARY OF VTF AND ASSESSED BUDGET CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE SUDAN 
MINE ACTION PROGRAMME 2003 - 201068 
 
                                                    
 
                                                    
68 Information from UNMAO 
VTF TOTAL TOTAL
Coordination 2.331.207       
Operations 1.454.746       
4.001.087          4.001.087      TOTAL 3.785.953       3.785.953       
VTF TOTAL TOTAL
Coordination 2.143.176       Coordination 798.120           
 TA / CB 2.099.079       Operations 1.023.658        
Tech. Survey 487.999           
Clearance 2.850.881       
Victim Assistance 76.335             
6.077.799          8.224.979      TOTAL 7.657.470       1.821.778       9.479.248       
VTF TOTAL TOTAL
Coordination 4.386.004       Coordination 4.016.272       Coordination 4.082.291       
Operations 9.865.581       TA / CB 3.241.982       Operations 9.128.587        
Clearance 9.304.960       
MRE 841.196           
15.584.359       14.251.585     29.835.944    TOTAL 17.404.410     13.210.878     30.615.288     
VTF TOTAL TOTAL
Coordination 6.304.914       Coordination /TA 2.129.547       Coordination 3.880.485       
Operations 22.353.786     Integr. Surv./Clear. 3.775.171       Operations 13.758.081      
Clearance 1.854.734       
Route Ver./Clear. 1.226.514       
LIS 743.750           
MRE 265.020           
9.799.178          28.658.700     38.457.878    TOTAL 9.994.736       17.638.566     27.633.302     
VTF TOTAL TOTAL
Coordination 6.655.489       Coordination /TA 3.577.913       Coordination 6.655.489       
Operations 26.719.849     Integr. Surv./Clear. 6.814.768       Operations 26.719.849      
Route Ver./Clear. 4.418.000       
LIS 1.588.033       
MRE 413.102           
17.318.342       33.375.338     50.693.680    TOTAL 16.811.816     33.375.338     50.187.154     
VTF TOTAL TOTAL
Coordination 9.136.934       Coordination /TA 6.878.106       Coordination 9.735.573       
Operations 30.588.866     Integr. Surv./Clear. 10.151.065     Operations 32.593.007      
Victim Assistance 821.614           
LIS 947.441           
MRE 201.586           
24.447.504       39.725.800     64.173.304    TOTAL 18.999.812     42.328.580     61.328.392     
VTF TOTAL TOTAL
Coordination 11.856.665     Coordination /TA 4.818.177       Coordination 12.474.452     
Operations 29.028.386     Integr. Surv./Clear. 17.708.428     Operations 30.540.900      
Victim Assistance 1.261.179       
LIS 777.498           
MRE 659.518           
10.730.506       40.885.051     51.615.557    TOTAL 25.224.800     43.015.352     68.240.152     
VTF TOTAL TOTAL
Coordination 13.011.024     Coordination /TA 4.262.293       Coordination 11.767.944     
Operations 31.854.576     Integr. Surv./Clear. 6.782.328       Operations 28.811.174      
Victim Assistance 1.295.287       
MRE 515.618           
8.006.051          44.865.600     52.871.651    TOTAL 12.855.526     40.579.118     53.434.644     
TOTAL 95.964.826       203.909.254   299.874.080 112.734.523   191.969.610   304.704.133   
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